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First-Price Common Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior and the "Winner's Curse."

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  • Kagel, John H, et al

Abstract

Experimental auction markets are characterized by a strong winner's curse in early auction periods as high bidders consistently lose money, failing to account for the adverse selection problem inherent in winning the auction. With experience and bankruptcy on the part of the worst offenders, subjects earn positive average profits, but these are far below Nash equilibrium predictions as a sizable minority of bids exceed the expected value of the item conditional on having the highest estimate of value. Individual bidding behavior is explored to identify the mechanism whereby market outcomes no longer display the worst effects of the winner's curse. Coauthors are Dan Levin, Raymond C. Battalio, and Donald J. Meyer. Copyright 1989 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Kagel, John H, et al, 1989. "First-Price Common Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior and the "Winner's Curse."," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(2), pages 241-258, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:27:y:1989:i:2:p:241-58
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Peeters Ronald & Tenev Anastas P., 2018. "Number of Bidders and the Winner’s Curse," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 1-4, July.
    2. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2007. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(6), pages 1721-1770, November.
    3. Goeree, Jacob K. & Offerman, Theo, 2003. "Winner's curse without overbidding," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 625-644, August.
    4. M. Kathleen Ngangoué & Georg Weizsäcker, 2021. "Learning from Unrealized versus Realized Prices," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 174-201, May.
    5. Ronald Peeters & Anastas P. Tenev, 2018. "Number of bidders and the winner’s curse," Working Papers 1802, University of Otago, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2018.
    6. James Cox & Stephen Hayne, 2006. "Barking up the right tree: Are small groups rational agents?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(3), pages 209-222, September.
    7. Wilfred Amaldoss & Sanjay Jain, 2008. "Joint Bidding in the Name-Your-Own-Price Channel: A Strategic Analysis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(10), pages 1685-1699, October.
    8. Shahriar, Quazi & Wooders, John, 2011. "An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 558-573, June.
    9. Cramton, Peter C, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 267-343, Summer.
    10. Anuja Hariharan & Marc Thomas Philipp Adam & Timm Teubner & Christof Weinhardt, 2016. "Think, feel, bid: the impact of environmental conditions on the role of bidders’ cognitive and affective processes in auction bidding," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, vol. 26(4), pages 339-355, November.
    11. repec:cup:judgdm:v:3:y:2008:i:7:p:483-492 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. James Cox & Sam Dinkin & James Swarthout, 2001. "Endogenous Entry and Exit in Common Value Auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(2), pages 163-181, October.
    13. Wouter van den Bos & Jian Li & Tatiana Lau & Eric Maskin & Jonathan D. Cohen & P. Read Montague & Samuel M. McClure, 2008. "The value of victory: social origins of the winner's curse in common value auctions," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 3(7), pages 483-492, October.
    14. Theo Offerman, 2002. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 625-643, June.
    15. Bendoly, Elliot & van Wezel, Wout & Bachrach, Daniel G. (ed.), 2015. "The Handbook of Behavioral Operations Management: Social and Psychological Dynamics in Production and Service Settings," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199357222.

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