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Corruption and the Distortion of Law Enforcement Effort

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  • Luciana Echazu
  • Nuno Garoupa

Abstract

We consider the distortions that corruption generates in law enforcement. Corruption dilutes deterrence, and hence the government needs to adjust law enforcement activities appropriately. We argue that this distortion is not the only one taking place. A misalignment of goals between the government and the enforcers results in another set of agency costs by which activities that put enforcers in direct contact with criminals increase at the cost of other law enforcement activities. The paper discusses the implications of both distortions. Copyright 2010, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Luciana Echazu & Nuno Garoupa, 2010. "Corruption and the Distortion of Law Enforcement Effort," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 12(1), pages 162-180.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:12:y:2010:i:1:p:162-180
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/aler/ahp020
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    Cited by:

    1. Li, Li & Lien, Donald & Wu, Yiping & Zhao, Yang, 2017. "Enforcement and Political Power in Anticorruption—Evidence from China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 133-147.
    2. Cooter Robert D. & Garoupa Nuno, 2014. "A Disruption Mechanism for Bribes," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(3), pages 241-263, November.
    3. Grajzl, Peter & Baniak, Andrzej, 2018. "Private enforcement, corruption, and antitrust design," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 284-307.
    4. Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa & Richard H. McAdams, 2016. "Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 105-141.
    5. Ken Yahagi, 2018. "Private law enforcement with competing groups," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 285-297, August.

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