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Enforcement and Political Power in Anticorruption—Evidence from China

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Listed:
  • Li, Li
  • Lien, Donald
  • Wu, Yiping
  • Zhao, Yang

Abstract

Few empirical studies focused on the role of officials in the anticorruption enforcement, especially in the authoritarian regime. This paper uses linear panel data models with various control variables to investigate how the power of the government official in an anticorruption agency may impact the effectiveness of anticorruption campaign in China. Two types of political power are considered. Formal power is obtained when the Discipline Inspection Secretary is also named as a Vice Party Secretary of the province whereas informal power arises when the Secretary used to work with the Party Secretary of the province. It is found that both the formal and informal power of the Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party’s Discipline Inspection Commission (i.e., the head of the anticorruption agency) help enhance the number of corruption cases under investigation. This result offers evidence to further explore how and why the anticorruption enforcement officials play their roles in a developing transitional country.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, Li & Lien, Donald & Wu, Yiping & Zhao, Yang, 2017. "Enforcement and Political Power in Anticorruption—Evidence from China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 133-147.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:98:y:2017:i:c:p:133-147
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.04.015
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