Agency Problems In Public Sector
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- Dr Olajire Aremu Odunlade & Prof Festus Folajinmi Adegbie, 2022. "Manufactured Export and Government Spending on Infrastructures in Nigeria (1990 – 2015)," International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS), vol. 6(6), pages 130-134, June.
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More about this item
Keywords
agency theory; information asymmetry; adverse selection; moral hayard; public resources;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- H59 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Other
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