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EITC and Marriage

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  • Dickert-Conlin, Stacy
  • Houser, Scott

Abstract

The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) could either penalize or subsidize marriage. Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation and controlling for individual fixed effects and the endogeneity of the EITC, we find that, among a sample of married women with children, those who face larger increases in their EITC are less likely to remain married. However, the effect is economically insignificant. We find no relationship between the EITC and marriage for unmarried women. We conclude that the EITC expansions during the early-to mid-1990s had little or no effect on marriage decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Dickert-Conlin, Stacy & Houser, Scott, 2002. "EITC and Marriage," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 55(1), pages 25-40, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:ntj:journl:v:55:y:2002:i:1:p:25-40
    DOI: 10.17310/ntj.2002.1.02
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Marriage: Part II," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(2), pages 11-26, Part II, .
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "A Theory of Marriage," NBER Chapters, in: Economics of the Family: Marriage, Children, and Human Capital, pages 299-351, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Katherine Michelmore, 2018. "The earned income tax credit and union formation: The impact of expected spouse earnings," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 377-406, June.
    2. Austin Nichols & Jesse Rothstein, 2015. "The Earned Income Tax Credit," NBER Chapters, in: Economics of Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States, Volume 1, pages 137-218, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Shogher Ohannessian & Ben Ost, 2022. "Do EITC eligibility rules encourage college enrollment?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(4), pages 1540-1558, October.
    4. David Neumark & Katherine E. Williams, 2020. "Do State Earned Income Tax Credits Increase Participation in the Federal EITC?," Public Finance Review, , vol. 48(5), pages 579-626, September.
    5. Shirley, Peter, 2018. "The response of commuting patterns to cross-border policy differentials: Evidence from the American Community Survey," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 1-16.
    6. Amanda Y. Agan & Michael D. Makowsky, 2023. "The Minimum Wage, EITC, and Criminal Recidivism," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 58(5), pages 1712-1751.
    7. Lawrence M. Berger & Sarah A. Font & Kristen S. Slack & Jane Waldfogel, 2017. "Income and child maltreatment in unmarried families: evidence from the earned income tax credit," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 1345-1372, December.
    8. Gregory Acs & Eric Toder, 2007. "Should we subsidize work? Welfare reform, the earned income tax credit and optimal transfers," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 14(3), pages 327-343, June.
    9. Cygan-Rehm, Kamila & Kuehnle, Daniel & Riphahn, Regina T., 2018. "Paid parental leave and families’ living arrangements," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 182-197.
    10. Leonard M. Lopoo & Kerri M. Raissian, 2014. "U.S. Social Policy and Family Complexity," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 654(1), pages 213-230, July.
    11. Elliott Isaac, 2020. "Marriage, Divorce, and Social Safety Net Policy," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 86(4), pages 1576-1612, April.
    12. Simpson, Nicole B., 2013. "Families, Taxes and the Welfare System," IZA Discussion Papers 7369, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Natasha Pilkauskas & Katherine Michelmore, 2019. "The Effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit on Housing and Living Arrangements," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 56(4), pages 1303-1326, August.
    14. Reagan Baughman & Stacy Dickert-Conlin, 2009. "The earned income tax credit and fertility," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 22(3), pages 537-563, July.
    15. Kampon Adireksombat, 2010. "The Effects of the 1993 Earned Income Tax Credit Expansion on the Labor Supply of Unmarried Women," Public Finance Review, , vol. 38(1), pages 11-40, January.
    16. John Karl Scholz, 2010. "The Earned Income Tax Credit and the U.S. Low-Wage Labor Market," ESRI Discussion paper series 237, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
    17. Chris Herbst, 2011. "The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit on Marriage and Divorce: Evidence from Flow Data," Population Research and Policy Review, Springer;Southern Demographic Association (SDA), vol. 30(1), pages 101-128, February.

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