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The Economics of Credit Rating Agencies

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  • Sangiorgi, Francesco
  • Spatt, Chester

Abstract

We explore through both an economics and regulatory lens the frictions associated with credit rating agencies in the aftermath of the financial crisis. While ratings and other public signals are an efficient response to scale economies in information production, these also can discourage independent due diligence and be a source of systemic risk. Though Dodd-Frank pulls back on the regulatory use of ratings, it also promotes greater regulation of the rating agencies. We highlight the diverse underlying views towards these competing approaches to reducing systemic risk. Our monograph also discusses the subtle contrasts between credit rating agencies and other types of due diligence providers, such as auditors, analysts and proxy-voting advisors. We discuss the frictions associated with paying for information in the context of credit ratings; while the issuer-pay model has been identified as a major issue because of potential conflict of interests, we argue that it has several advantages over the investor-pay model in promoting market transparency.

Suggested Citation

  • Sangiorgi, Francesco & Spatt, Chester, 2017. "The Economics of Credit Rating Agencies," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 12(1), pages 1-116, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:fntfin:0500000048
    DOI: 10.1561/0500000048
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Skreta, Vasiliki & Veldkamp, Laura, 2009. "Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 678-695, July.
    2. Strausz, Roland, 2005. "Honest certification and the threat of capture," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 45-62, February.
    3. Laura L. Veldkamp, 2006. "Media Frenzies in Markets for Financial Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 577-601, June.
    4. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    5. Xia, Han, 2014. "Can investor-paid credit rating agencies improve the information quality of issuer-paid rating agencies?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 450-468.
    6. Lawrence J. White, 2010. "Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 24(2), pages 211-226, Spring.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rosati, Nicoletta & Bellia, Mario & Matos, Pedro Verga & Oliveira, Vasco, 2020. "Ratings matter: Announcements in times of crisis and the dynamics of stock markets," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    2. Xudong An & Larry Cordell & Joseph B. Nichols, 2020. "Reputation, Information, and Herding in Credit Ratings: Evidence from CMBS," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 476-504, October.
    3. Elisabeth Kempf & Margarita Tsoutsoura, 2021. "Partisan Professionals: Evidence from Credit Rating Analysts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(6), pages 2805-2856, December.
    4. Abidi, Nordine & Falagiarda, Matteo & Miquel-Flores, Ixart, 2023. "Quantitative easing and credit rating agencies," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    5. Andra C. Ghent & Kristian R. Miltersen & Walter N. Torous, 2020. "Second Mortgages: Valuation and Implications for the Performance of Structured Financial Products," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1234-1273, December.
    6. Hung, Mingyi & Kraft, Pepa & Wang, Shiheng & Yu, Gwen, 2022. "Market power and credit rating standards: Global evidence," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2).
    7. Goergen, Marc & Gounopoulos, Dimitrios & Koutroumpis, Panagiotis, 2021. "Do multiple credit ratings reduce money left on the table? Evidence from U.S. IPOs," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    8. Leuz, Christian & Malani, Anup & Muhn, Maximilian & Jakab, László, 2022. "Do conflict of interests disclosures work? Evidence from citations in medical journals," CFS Working Paper Series 702, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    9. Terovitis, Spyros, 2022. "Information disclosure and the feedback effect in capital markets," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).
    10. Basu, Kaushik & Sun, Haokun, 2022. "The power and influence of rating agencies with insights into their misuse," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    11. Fathi Nakai & Tarek Chebbi, 2023. "The informational content of sovereign credit rating: another look," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 24(5), pages 353-373, September.
    12. Alanis, Emmanuel, 2020. "Is there valuable private information in credit ratings?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    13. Martijn Boermans & Bram van der Kroft, 2020. "Capital regulation induced reaching for systematic yield: Financial instability through fire sales," Working Papers 673, DNB.
    14. Anna Bayona & Oana Peia & Razvan Vlahu, 2023. "Credit Ratings and Investments," Working Papers 776, DNB.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credit rating agencies; information production; information intermediation; conflict of interest; reputation; selection; competition; regulation; systemic risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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