Effect Assessment under Russian Enforcement against Anticompetitive Agreements: Decisions of Commercial Courts
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Svetlana Avdasheva & Dina Tsytsulina & Elena Sidorova, 2015. "The Use of Key Performance Indicators for the FAS: Analysis Based on the Statistics of Adjudications," Public administration issues, Higher School of Economics, issue 3, pages 7-34.
- Nuno Garoupa & Matteo Rizzolli, 2012. "Wrongful Convictions Do Lower Deterrence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(2), pages 224-231, June.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Авдашева С. Б. & Макаров А. В., 2017. "Оценка Эффектов При Запрете Антиконкурентных Соглашений: Решения Арбитражных Судов," Вопросы государственного и муниципального управления // Public administration issues, НИУ ВШЭ, issue 3, pages 51-71.
- Grajzl, Peter & Baniak, Andrzej, 2018.
"Private enforcement, corruption, and antitrust design,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 284-307.
- Peter Grajzl & Andrzej Baniak, 2015. "Private Enforcement, Corruption, and Antitrust Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 5602, CESifo.
- Obidzinski, Marie & Oytana, Yves, 2019.
"Identity errors and the standard of proof,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 73-80.
- Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2019. "Identity errors and the standard of proof," Post-Print hal-04035094, HAL.
- Matteo Rizzolli & Luca Stanca, 2012.
"Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(2), pages 311-338.
- Matteo Rizzolli & Luca Stanca, 2009. "Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 170, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2009.
- Bertrand Chopard & Edwige Marion & Ludivine Roussey, 2014.
"Does the Appeals Process Lower the Occurrence of Legal Errors?,"
EconomiX Working Papers
2014-43, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Bertrand Chopard & Edwige Marion & Ludivine Roussey, 2014. "Does the Appeals Process Lower the Occurrence of Legal Errors?," Working Papers hal-04141314, HAL.
- Roee Sarel, 2022. "Crime and punishment in times of pandemics," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 155-186, October.
- Chopard Bertrand & Fain Edwige & Roussey Ludivine, 2018.
"Does the Appeals Process Reduce the Occurrence of Legal Errors?,"
Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 1-18, July.
- Bertrand Chopard & Edwige Faïn & Ludivine Roussey, 2017. "Does the Appeals Process Reduce the Occurrence of Legal Errors?," Post-Print hal-04134740, HAL.
- Avdasheva, Svetlana & Golovanova, Svetlana & Katsoulacos, Yannis, 2019. "The role of judicial review in developing evidentiary standards: The example of market analysis in Russian competition law enforcement," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 101-114.
- Robertson, Matthew J., 2018. "Wrongful Conviction, Persuasion and Loss Aversion," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 48, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
- Pavlova, Natalia & Shastitko, Andrey, 2014.
"Effects of Hostility Tradition in Antitrust: Leniency Programs and Cooperation Agreements,"
EconStor Preprints
122051, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- Natalia Pavlova & Andrey Shastitko, 2014. "Effects Of Hostility Tradition In Antitrust: Leniency Programs And Cooperation Agreements," HSE Working papers WP BRP 58/EC/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
- Shastitko, Andrey E. & Golovanova, Svetlana V., 2014.
"Collusion In Markets Characterized By One Large Buyer: Lessons Learned From An Antitrust Case In Russia,"
EconStor Research Reports
122048, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- Andrei Y. Shastitko & Svetlana V. Golovanova, 2014. "Collusion in markets characterized by one large buyer: lessons learned from an antitrust case in Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 49/EC/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
- Rizzolli, Matteo & Tremewan, James, 2018. "Hard labor in the lab: Deterrence, non-monetary sanctions, and severe procedures," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 107-121.
- Еlena Dobrolyubova & Vladimir Yuzhakov, 2015. "Evaluating Effectiveness and Efficiency of the Control (Supervision) Activities," Public administration issues, Higher School of Economics, issue 4, pages 41-64.
- Shastitko, Andrei (Шаститко, Андрей) & Golovanova, Svetlana, 2016. "The mediator - not what you think (for economic policy lessons) [Посредник — Не То, О Чем Вы Подумали]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 43-60, February.
- Lando, Henrik & Mungan, Murat C., 2018. "The effect of type-1 error on deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 1-8.
- Shastitko, Andrey, 2014. "Effects of the Third Party Errors," Published Papers re9021, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
- Mungan Murat C., 2013. "Optimal Warning Strategies: Punishment Ought Not to Be Inflicted Where the Penal Provision Is Not Properly Conveyed," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(3), pages 303-339, November.
- Matteo Rizzolli & Margherita Saraceno, 2013. "Better that ten guilty persons escape: punishment costs explain the standard of evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 395-411, June.
- Mungan, Murat C., 2014. "A behavioral justification for escalating punishment schemes," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 189-197.
- Mungan Murat C., 2018. "Mere Preparation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 1-15, July.
More about this item
Keywords
antitrust enforcement; per se illegality; rule of reason; object-based enforcement; horizontal and vertical anticompetitive agreements; judicial review of infringement decisions;All these keywords.
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nos:vgmu00:2017:i:3:p:51-71. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Irina A. Zvereva (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://vgmu.hse.ru/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.