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Bankregulierung zur Lösung des „too big to fail“-Problems

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  • Rudolph, Bernd

Abstract

Systemically Important Banks (SIBs) that are deemed „too big to fail“ call for a separate regulation. The reasons are that in case of potential default of such a bank, taxpayers carry the burden of a bailout and the anticipation of this rescue option induces banks to take on more risk than they would have done without it. The article discusses the indicator based approach for identifying SIBs as proposed by the Basel Committee and other measures of the EU and Basel III that aim to reduce the default probability of these banks. Further, the article introduces and discusses the new tool box which is designed to render an ordered liquidation of SIBs possible in a way that avoids further domino effects and harm to the economy. en

Suggested Citation

  • Rudolph, Bernd, 2014. "Bankregulierung zur Lösung des „too big to fail“-Problems," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 68(2), pages 72-91.
    • Handle: RePEc:nms:untern:10.5771/0042-059x-2014-2-72
    DOI: 10.5771/0042-059X-2014-2-72
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    References listed on IDEAS

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