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Contingent capital to strengthen the private safety net for financial institutions: Cocos to the rescue?

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  • von Furstenberg, George M.

Abstract

This study examines the promise of reducing expected resolution costs of financial institutions through either voluntary or mandated addition of contingently convertible debt securities to their long-term financing mix. I model the stochastic process by which an initially very well capitalized banking firm may come to violate its minimum capital maintenance requirement. Conversion of cocos then provides a second chance because the firm's initial capitalization is restored. Although regulatory insolvency remains a distant threat, the expected reductions in the cost of bankruptcy and hence the cost of capital are such that cocos may win a place in the liability structure of financial institutions without the need for mandates.

Suggested Citation

  • von Furstenberg, George M., 2011. "Contingent capital to strengthen the private safety net for financial institutions: Cocos to the rescue?," Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies 2011,01, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdp2:201101
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    Cited by:

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    2. Bernd Rudolph, 2013. "Contingent Convertibles (CoCo-Bonds) als Bail-in-Instrumente für Banken," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 65(67), pages 97-122, January.
    3. George M. von Furstenberg, 2012. "Mega-Banks' Self-Insurance with Cocos: A Work in Progress," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Risk Management Institute, Singapore (ed.), Global Credit Review, chapter 4, pages 53-77, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Li, Ping & Guo, Yanhong & Meng, Hui, 2022. "The default contagion of contingent convertible bonds in financial network," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    5. Chia-Chien Chang & Min-Teh Yu, 2018. "Bank Contingent Capital: Valuation and the Role of Market Discipline," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 54(1), pages 49-80, August.
    6. Philippe Oster, 2020. "Contingent Convertible bond literature review: making everything and nothing possible?," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(4), pages 343-381, December.
    7. Rudolph, Bernd, 2014. "Bankregulierung zur Lösung des „too big to fail“-Problems," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 68(2), pages 72-91.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    financial reforms; regulatory insolvency; contingent capital; bank regulations; cocos;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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