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Nadzór bankowy i jego miejsce w krajach Unii Europejskiej

Author

Listed:
  • Łukasz Sobora

    (Narodowy Bank Polski)

Abstract

Celem artykułu jest wskazanie optymalnego modelu nadzoru bankowego z perspektywy jego umiejscowienia. Możliwe są trzy rozwiązania: (1) w banku centralnym, (2) poza bankiem centralnym, co oznacza powierzenie zadań nadzorczych innemu organowi, lub (3) rozwiązanie pośrednie – podział zadań nadzorczych pomiędzy bank centralny i wydzieloną instytucję. Określenie optymalnego modelu nadzoru bankowego będzie efektem analizy danych w kontekście stopy inflacji, współczynnika Z-score i wskaźnika kredytów zagrożonych w stosunku do kredytów ogółem, a także usystematyzowania dostępnej literatury. Obecna złożoność rynków finansowych i zróżnicowanie badanych państw utrudniają wybór jednego modelu pasującego do wszystkich prezentowanych struktur nadzoru, jednak na podstawie średnich wielkości można wskazać umiejscowienie nadzoru najbardziej zbliżone do optymalnego.

Suggested Citation

  • Łukasz Sobora, 2024. "Nadzór bankowy i jego miejsce w krajach Unii Europejskiej," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 55(2), pages 163-180.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbp:nbpbik:v:55:y:2024:i:2:p:163-180
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aleksandra Nadolska, 2022. "Czy Polska potrzebuje nadzoru finansowego typu Twin Peaks?," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 53(2), pages 203-230.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bank centralny; model nadzoru bankowego/finansowego; stabilność finansowa; kryzys finansowy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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