Fairness violations elicit greater punishment on behalf of another than for oneself
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Abstract
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DOI: 10.1038/ncomms6306
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Dhaliwal, Nathan A. & Patil, Indrajeet & Cushman, Fiery, 2021. "Reputational and cooperative benefits of third-party compensation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 27-51.
- Bradley D Mattan & Denise M Barth & Alexandra Thompson & Oriel FeldmanHall & Jasmin Cloutier & Jennifer T Kubota, 2020. "Punishing the privileged: Selfish offers from high-status allocators elicit greater punishment from third-party arbitrators," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(5), pages 1-20, May.
- Pieter T. M. Desmet & Franziska Weber, 2022. "Infringers’ willingness to pay compensation versus fines," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 63-80, February.
- Casal, Sandro & Fallucchi, Francesco & Quercia, Simone, 2019.
"The role of morals in three-player ultimatum games,"
Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 67-79.
- Sandro Casal & Francesco Fallucchi & Simone Quercia, 2017. "The role of morals in three-player ultimatum games," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 16-05R, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- CASAL Sandro & FALLUCCHI Francesco & QUERCIA Simone, 2018. "The Role of Morals in Three-Player Ultimatum Games," LISER Working Paper Series 2018-15, Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER).
- Janne Doorn & Marcel Zeelenberg & Seger M. Breugelmans, 2018. "An exploration of third parties’ preference for compensation over punishment: six experimental demonstrations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 333-351, October.
- Bicchieri, Cristina & Maras, Marta, 2022. "Intentionality matters for third-party punishment but not compensation in trust games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 205-220.
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