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Utilization of a Local Coefficient for Immovable Property Tax in the Czech Republic

Author

Listed:
  • Lucie Formanová

    (Department of Accounting and Taxes, Faculty of Business and Economics, Mendel University in Brno, Zemědělská 1, 613 00 Brno, Czech Republic)

  • Martina Halamová

    (Department of Accounting and Taxes, Faculty of Business and Economics, Mendel University in Brno, Zemědělská 1, 613 00 Brno, Czech Republic)

  • Břetislav Andrlík

    (Department of Accounting and Taxes, Faculty of Business and Economics, Mendel University in Brno, Zemědělská 1, 613 00 Brno, Czech Republic)

Abstract

The paper deals with the issue of using a local coefficient as a tool to increase tax revenues of local government budgets in the Czech Republic. The local coefficient is defined as a corrective element increasing up to five times the immovable property tax that is 100% public budgets of local governments (municipalities) since 2009. As part of the paper, our own questionnaire survey was conducted across municipalities in the Czech Republic with the aim of identifying positive and negative consequences of application or non-application of this tax instrument at the level of local governments. Results of the research clearly demonstrate the use of the local coefficient, despite its potential high budget revenue is not high at all. In 2020, only 10.43% municipalities from all over the Czech Republic applied it. A research survey conducted among municipalities focused on obtaining information on the reasons for the low use of the local coefficient. To this end, two research questions were formulated "Do municipalities have sufficient information on local coefficient issues?" and "May the introduction of a local coefficient result in a loss in the communal elections?" The questionnaire survey showed that 91% municipalities know about their possibility to apply a local coefficient, but do not use it. Moreover, it was found that if the local coefficient is introduced at the right time or handling additional tax revenues of the municipality is transparent, its introduction does not affect the election result of the political party that declared it by a generally valid decree.

Suggested Citation

  • Lucie Formanová & Martina Halamová & Břetislav Andrlík, 2020. "Utilization of a Local Coefficient for Immovable Property Tax in the Czech Republic," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 68(6), pages 973-986.
    • Handle: RePEc:mup:actaun:actaun_2020068060973
    DOI: 10.11118/actaun202068060973
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pierre Mandon & Antoine Cazals, 2019. "Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation By Leaders Versus Manipulation By Researchers? Evidence From A Meta‐Regression Analysis," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(1), pages 274-308, February.
    2. Blais, Andre & Nadeau, Richard, 1992. "The Electoral Budget Cycle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(4), pages 389-403, December.
    3. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
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