IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mup/actaun/actaun_2012060040319.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A simple in-class experiment on the efficient production of the pure public good touching the median voter theorem

Author

Listed:
  • Domenico Raguseo

    (Katedra verejnej ekonomiky, Ekonomická fakulta, Univerzita Mateja Béla, Banska Bystrica, Tajovského 10, 975 90 Banská Bystrica, Slovenská republika)

  • Jiří Špalek

    (Katedra veřejné ekonomie, Ekonomicko-správní fakulta, Masarykova univerzita, Lipová 41a, 602 00 Brno, Česká republika)

  • Martin Klus

    (Katedra politológie, Fakulta politických vied a medzinárodných vzťahov, Univerzita Mateja Béla, Banska Bystrica, Kuzmányho 1, 974 01 Banská Bystrica, Slovenská republika)

Abstract

The paper show possibilities of introducing modern methods into public economy and finance teaching. We present in-class experiment which illustrates one of typical model from political economy - the median voter theorem. Students are endowed with cards that represent their preferences on different levels of the public good production. They compare benefit they can get from different levels of public good (these levels represent three candidates) and then they vote for the most preferred level. This process continues for several rounds, with a new election taking place with a different sample of students. The in-class experiment demonstrates that the simplicity of the median voter theorem, when there are more than two candidates, provides only an imprecise prediction of the collective choice.The methodology of the experiment is enriched by the statistical analysis of experimental results from experiment cartied out by the authors in Czech Republic and Slovakia.

Suggested Citation

  • Domenico Raguseo & Jiří Špalek & Martin Klus, 2012. "A simple in-class experiment on the efficient production of the pure public good touching the median voter theorem," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 60(4), pages 319-326.
    • Handle: RePEc:mup:actaun:actaun_2012060040319
    DOI: 10.11118/actaun201260040319
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://acta.mendelu.cz/doi/10.11118/actaun201260040319.html
    Download Restriction: free of charge
    File URL: http://acta.mendelu.cz/doi/10.11118/actaun201260040319.pdf
    Download Restriction: free of charge
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.11118/actaun201260040319?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roger Hewett & Charles A. Holt & Georgia Kosmopoulou & Christine Kymn & Cheryl X. Long & Shabnam Mousavi & Sudipta Sarangi, 2005. "A Classroom Exercise: Voting by Ballots and Feet," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(1), pages 253-263, July.
    2. Forsythe, Robert & Rietz, Thomas & Myerson, Roger & Weber, Robert, 1996. "An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three-Candidate Elections," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(3), pages 355-383.
    3. Arthur J. H. C. Schram, 2008. "Experimental Public Choice," Springer Books, in: Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, chapter 32, pages 579-591, Springer.
    4. Patrick A. McNutt, 1996. "The Economics of Public Choice," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 58.
    5. Kenneth Collier & Richard McKelvey & Peter Ordeshook & Kenneth Williams, 1987. "Retrospective voting: An experimental study," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 101-130, January.
    6. Roger A McCain, 2014. "Game Theory:A Nontechnical Introduction to the Analysis of Strategy," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 9044, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Arnaud Dellis & Sean D’Evelyn & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2011. "Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: an experiment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(2), pages 171-200, July.
    2. Thomas R. Palfrey, 2005. "Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy," Working Papers 91, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    3. Thomas R. Palfrey, 2005. "Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy," Working Papers 91, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    4. Søberg, Martin, 2003. "Voting rules and endogenous trading institutions: An experimental study," Memorandum 17/2002, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    5. Rusinowska, Agnieszka & Taalaibekova, Akylai, 2019. "Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 9-27.
    6. Costel Andonie & Daniel Diermeier, 2022. "Electoral Institutions with impressionable voters," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(3), pages 683-733, October.
    7. Arnaud Dellis, 2022. "Does Party Polarization Affect the Electoral Prospects of a New Centrist Candidate?," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-20, July.
    8. Péter Elek & János Köllő, 2019. "Eliciting permanent and transitory undeclared work from matched administrative and survey data," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 46(3), pages 547-576, August.
    9. Rui Nuno Baleiras & Jose da Silva Costa, 2001. "To be or not to be in office again, that is the question: political business cycles with local governments," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp402, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
    10. Arthur J. H. C. Schram, 2008. "Experimental Public Choice," Springer Books, in: Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, chapter 32, pages 579-591, Springer.
    11. Vetter, Stefan, 2013. "Delegating decision rights for anticipated rewards as an alternative to corruption: An experiment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 188-204.
    12. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2017. "Multicandidate elections: Aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 132-150.
    13. Kei Kawai & Yasutora Watanabe, 2013. "Inferring Strategic Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 624-662, April.
    14. Richard Potthoff, 2011. "Condorcet Polling," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 67-86, July.
    15. Boukouras, Aristotelis & Jennings, Will & Li, Lunzheng & Maniadis, Zacharias, 2023. "Can biased polls distort electoral results? Evidence from the lab," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    16. Christoph Kuzmics & Daniel Rodenburger, 2018. "A case of evolutionary stable attainable equilibrium in the lab," Graz Economics Papers 2018-05, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    17. Durand, François & Macé, Antonin & Núñez, Matías, 2024. "Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 1-34.
    18. Tugba Karabiyik & Aparajita Jaiswal & Paul Thomas & Alejandra J. Magana, 2020. "Understanding the Interactions between the Scrum Master and the Development Team: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(9), pages 1-21, September.
    19. Shinya Horie, 2017. "Procurement Auctions with Uncertainty in Corruption," Discussion Papers 1710, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
    20. Gabriele Camera & Cary Deck & David Porter, 2016. "Do Economic Inequalities Affect Long-Run Cooperation?," Working Papers 16-18, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mup:actaun:actaun_2012060040319. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ivo Andrle (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://mendelu.cz/en/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.