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The Inquisitorial and the Adversarial Procedure in a Criminal Court Setting

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  • Bruno Deffains
  • Dominique Demougin

Abstract

We provide a comparison of the adversarial and inquisitorial trial procedures. We find that social costs associated with a given level of justice are always smaller under the adversarial rule. Nevertheless, the inquisitorial rule may be better because it allows for state control of all the investigative expenditures. In contrast, under the adversarial procedure, investigative expenditures will be mainly constrained by individual wealth, leading to inefficient justice levels, higher social cost, and potentially large inequalities.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Deffains & Dominique Demougin, 2008. "The Inquisitorial and the Adversarial Procedure in a Criminal Court Setting," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 31-43, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200803)164:1_31:tiatap_2.0.tx_2-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Palumbo, Giuliana & Iossa, Elisabetta, 2002. "Decision rules and information provision: monitoring versus manipulation," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 452, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    2. Hyun Song Shin, 1998. "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 378-405, Summer.
    3. Palumbo, Giuliana, 2001. "Trial procedures and optimal limits on proof-taking10," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 309-327, September.
    4. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring.
    5. Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 2000. "On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 365-394, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2020. "Presumption of Innocence and Deterrence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 176(2), pages 377-412.
    2. Chulyoung Kim, 2017. "An economic rationale for dismissing low-quality experts in trial," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 64(5), pages 445-466, November.
    3. Christoph Engel & Urs Schweizer, 2008. "Editorial Preface," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 1-3, March.
    4. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2018. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 67-107, August.
    5. Kim, Chulyoung, 2015. "Centralized vs. Decentralized Institutions for Expert Testimony," MPRA Paper 69618, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Chulyoung Kim & Paul S. Koh, 2020. "Court‐appointed experts and accuracy in adversarial litigation," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 16(3), pages 282-305, September.
    7. Chulyoung Kim, 2014. "Partisan Advocates," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(4), pages 313-332, October.
    8. Chulyoung Kim, 2014. "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures with Information Acquisition," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(4), pages 767-803.
    9. William J. Stuntz, 2008. "Inequality and Adversarial Criminal Procedure. Comment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 47-51, March.
    10. Bertrand Crettez & Bruno Deffains, 2008. "On the Role of Inequalities in Legal Systems: A Tocquevilian View," Working Papers hal-04140746, HAL.

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    JEL classification:

    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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