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Evidence of the Need for Aggregate Litigation. Comment

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  • Theodore Eisenberg

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  • Theodore Eisenberg, 2007. "Evidence of the Need for Aggregate Litigation. Comment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(1), pages 158-162, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200703)163:1_158:eotnfa_2.0.tx_2-e
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & M. Vittoria Levati & Georg von Wangenheim, 2007. "On the Coevolution of Retribution and Trustworthiness: An (Indirect) Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(1), pages 143-157, March.
    2. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, 2004. "Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 1(1), pages 27-78, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Theodore Eisenberg & Christoph Engel, 2014. "Assuring Civil Damages Adequately Deter: A Public Good Experiment," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(2), pages 301-349, June.
    2. Theodore Eisenberg & Christoph Engel, 2012. "Assuring Adequate Deterrence in Tort: A Public Good Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_07, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

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