IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mhr/jinste/urnsici0932-4569(200206)1582_256cfwmlt_2.0.tx_2-h.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Coordination Failure with Multiple-Source Lending, the Cost of Protection Against a Powerful Lender

Author

Listed:
  • Franz Hubert
  • Dorothea Schäfer

Abstract

We analyze how a firm might protect quasirents in an environment of imperfect capital markets, where switching lenders is costly to the borrower, and contracts are incomplete. As switching costs make the firm vulnerable to ex post exploitation, it may want to diversify lending. Multiple-source lending, however, suffers from coordination failure. An uncoordinated withdrawal of funds will force a financially distressed firm into bankruptcy even though it could have been rescued if lenders had stayed firm. We show that the gains from preventing renegotiation do outweigh the cost of coordination failure if a single lender has sufficient bargaining power.

Suggested Citation

  • Franz Hubert & Dorothea Schäfer, 2002. "Coordination Failure with Multiple-Source Lending, the Cost of Protection Against a Powerful Lender," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(2), pages 256-275, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200206)158:2_256:cfwmlt_2.0.tx_2-h
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/coordination-failure-with-multiple-source-lending-the-cost-of-protection-against-a-powerful-lender-1016280932456022975394
    Download Restriction: Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-597, June.
    2. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
    3. Wakker, Peter, 1989. "Continuous subjective expected utility with non-additive probabilities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-27, February.
    4. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1992. "Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-1400, September.
    5. Sharpe, Steven A, 1990. "Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1069-1087, September.
    6. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-587, May.
    7. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1996. "Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 1-25, February.
    8. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. "The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-37, March.
    9. Hoshi, Takeo & Kashyap, Anil & Scharfstein, David, 1990. "The role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress in Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 67-88, September.
    10. Farinha, Luisa A. & Santos, Joao A. C., 2002. "Switching from Single to Multiple Bank Lending Relationships: Determinants and Implications," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 124-151, April.
    11. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-1277, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Huang, Jiayi & Matthews, Kent & Zhou, Peng, 2020. "What causes Chinese listed firms to switch bank loan provider? Evidence from a survival analysis," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(C).
    2. Luigi Guiso & Raoul Minetti, 2010. "The Structure of Multiple Credit Relationships: Evidence from U.S. Firms," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(6), pages 1037-1071, September.
    3. Christina Bannier, 2007. "Heterogeneous multiple bank financing: does it reduce inefficient credit-renegotiation incidences?," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 21(4), pages 445-470, December.
    4. Cenni, Stefano & Monferrà, Stefano & Salotti, Valentina & Sangiorgi, Marco & Torluccio, Giuseppe, 2015. "Credit rationing and relationship lending. Does firm size matter?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 249-265.
    5. Kasahara, Tetsuya, 2009. "Coordination failure among multiple lenders and the role and effects of public policy," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 183-198, June.
    6. Lucia Gibilaro & Gianluca Mattarocci, 2021. "Financial Distress and Information Sharing: Evidences from the Italian Credit Register," Risks, MDPI, vol. 9(5), pages 1-12, May.
    7. Schäfer, Dorothea, 2002. "Restructuring Know How and Collateral," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 35(4), pages 572-597.
    8. Christopher F. Baum & Caterina Forti Grazzini & Dorothea Schäfer, 2020. "Institutional Diversity in Domestic Banking Sectors and Bank Stability: A Cross-Country Study," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1869, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    9. Flavio Bazzana & Marco Palmieri, 2012. "How to increase the efficiency of bond covenants: a proposal for the Italian corporate market," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 327-346, October.
    10. Manz, Michael, 2010. "Information-based contagion and the implications for financial fragility," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(7), pages 900-910, October.
    11. Christian Koziol, 2010. "Impact of Imperfect Information on the Optimal Exercise Strategy for Warrants," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 16(3), pages 374-399, June.
    12. Ralf Elsas & Frank Heinemann & Marcel Tyrell, 2004. "Multiple but Asymmetric Bank Financing: The Case of Relationship Lending," CESifo Working Paper Series 1251, CESifo.
    13. Peter Ockenfels & Rosemarie Nagel & Frank Heinemann, 2002. "Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information," FMG Discussion Papers dp416, Financial Markets Group.
    14. Idir Cherief & Camille Cornand, 2003. "Le traitement juridique de l’insolvabilité à l’échelle internationale : vers des procédures internationales de faillite des entreprises dans les pays émergents," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 72(3), pages 337-358.
    15. Petya Platikanova & Kazbi Soonawalla, 2020. "Who monitors opaque borrowers? Debt specialisation, institutional ownership, and information opacity," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(2), pages 1867-1904, June.
    16. Castro, Paula & Keasey, Kevin & Amor-Tapia, Borja & Tascon, Maria T. & Vallascas, Francesco, 2020. "Does debt concentration depend on the risk-taking incentives in CEO compensation?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Yuta Ogane, 2016. "Banking relationship numbers and new business bankruptcies," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 169-185, February.
    2. Jarko Fidrmuc & Philipp Schreiber & Martin Siddiqui, 2018. "Intangible Assets and the Determinants of a Single Bank Relation of German SMEs," European Journal of Business Science and Technology, Mendel University in Brno, Faculty of Business and Economics, vol. 4(1), pages 5-30.
    3. Doris Neuberger & Solvig Räthke, 2009. "Microenterprises and multiple bank relationships: The case of professionals," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 207-229, February.
    4. Yasuda, Ayako, 2007. "Bank relationships and underwriter competition: Evidence from Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 369-404, November.
    5. Carletti, Elena & Cerasi, Vittoria & Daltung, Sonja, 2007. "Multiple-bank lending: Diversification and free-riding in monitoring," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 425-451, July.
    6. Laurent Vilanova, 2002. "Risque juridique et rôle des banques dans le gouvernement des entreprises," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 5(4), pages 137-175, December.
    7. Hasan, Iftekhar & Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Jagiełło, Robert & Kowalewski, Oskar & Kozłowski, Łukasz, 2021. "Local banks as difficult-to-replace SME lenders: Evidence from bank corrective programs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    8. Carletti, Elena, 2004. "The structure of bank relationships, endogenous monitoring, and loan rates," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 58-86, January.
    9. Vigneron, Ludovic & Hajj Chehade, Hiba, 2013. "Structuration du pool bancaire de la PME : une revue de la littérature [Structuring SMEs' banks relationships: a review]," MPRA Paper 50498, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Veronica Rappoport & Philipp Schnabl & Daniel Paravisini, 2015. "Comparative Advantage and Specialization in Bank Lending," 2015 Meeting Papers 499, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    11. Refait-Alexandre, Catherine & Serve, Stéphanie, 2020. "Multiple banking relationships: Do SMEs mistrust their banks?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    12. Saibal Ghosh, 2019. "Lending Relationships, Borrowing Costs and Crisis: Evidence from Indian Micro Data," Global Business Review, International Management Institute, vol. 20(4), pages 1026-1050, August.
    13. Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Leonardo Gambacorta & Paolo Emilio Mistrulli, 2016. "Relationship and Transaction Lending in a Crisis," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(10), pages 2643-2676.
    14. Belaid, Faiçal & Boussaada, Rim & Belguith, Houda, 2017. "Bank-firm relationship and credit risk: An analysis on Tunisian firms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 532-543.
    15. Elsas, Ralf & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2002. "Collateral, relationship lending and financial distress: An empirical study on financial contracting," CFS Working Paper Series 2002/17, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    16. Xavier Freixas, 2005. "Deconstructing relationship banking," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(1), pages 3-31, January.
    17. Keil, Jan, 2023. "Lending relationships when creditors are in control," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    18. Bonfim, Diana & Dai, Qinglei & Franco, Francesco, 2018. "The number of bank relationships and borrowing costs: The role of information asymmetries," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 191-209.
    19. Wenlian Gao & Feifei Zhu & Kai Chen, 2023. "The role of bank lenders in firm leverage adjustments," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 63-97, February.
    20. Christina Bannier, 2007. "Heterogeneous multiple bank financing: does it reduce inefficient credit-renegotiation incidences?," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 21(4), pages 445-470, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200206)158:2_256:cfwmlt_2.0.tx_2-h. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Wolpert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/jite .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.