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'Credibility as a trade off' in electricity industries, a first evaluation

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  • Yannick Perez

Abstract

In the early 1990s, Pablo Spiller worked on North and Williamson's application of the New Institutional Economics, on the conditions of credible network reforms. Credibility is defined as the capacity to provide reform commitments. This work, started from a Positive Political Economics Veto Point Model, has been constructed and applied with good results. The Author will show the consequences of the 'credibility as a trade off' concept in the efficiency of Regulatory Instruments studied and then introduce two improvements. Self-Regulation is introduced and their performance reconsidered in order to achieve the trade off between commitment and flexibility.

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  • Yannick Perez, 2005. "'Credibility as a trade off' in electricity industries, a first evaluation," Global Business and Economics Review, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 7(2/3), pages 278-291.
    • Handle: RePEc:ids:gbusec:v:7:y:2005:i:2/3:p:278-291
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gilbert,Richard J. & Kahn,Edward P. (ed.), 1996. "International Comparisons of Electricity Regulation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521495905, September.
    2. North,Douglass C., 1991. "Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521394161, September.
    3. Brousseau,Eric & Glachant,Jean-Michel (ed.), 2002. "The Economics of Contracts," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521814904, September.
    4. Pablo T. Spiller & Ingo Vogelsang, 1997. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment in the UK: The Case of Telecommunications," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 153(4), pages 607-607, December.
    5. Douglass C. North, 1991. "Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 97-112, Winter.
    6. Spiller, Pablo T, 1996. "Institutions and Commitment," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 5(2), pages 421-452.
    7. Brousseau,Eric & Glachant,Jean-Michel (ed.), 2002. "The Economics of Contracts," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521893138, September.
    8. repec:hal:journl:hal-01660436 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12331 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-277, Fall.
    11. Claude Ménard (ed.), 2000. "Institutions, Contracts and Organizations," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1921.
    12. Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
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    1. Perez, Yannick & Ramos-Real, Francisco Javier, 2009. "The public promotion of wind energy in Spain from the transaction costs perspective 1986-2007," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 13(5), pages 1058-1066, June.

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