IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mhr/finarc/urndoi10.1628-fa-2018-0022.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

European Unification Based on Flexibility and Diversity

Author

Listed:
  • Bruno S. Frey

Abstract

European unification has a noble aim but is endangered by encompassing egalitarianism and bureaucratization, and is moreover subject to a major democracy deficit. This paper argues that flexible and dynamic entities whose territoriality is determined by issues are appropriate for a Europe of the 21st century. The first step must be to constitutionally allow the emergence and existence of corresponding political entities with taxing and spending power. Over time these flexible, democratic, and diverse political units will take over those activities national states and the EU do not fulfill well.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno S. Frey, 2019. "European Unification Based on Flexibility and Diversity," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 75(1), pages 93-109.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:doi:10.1628/fa-2018-0022
    DOI: 10.1628/fa-2018-0022
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/european-unification-based-on-flexibility-and-diversity-101628fa-2018-0022
    Download Restriction: Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1628/fa-2018-0022?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Schneider Friedrich, 1992. "The Federal And Fiscal Structures Of Representative And Direct Democracies As Models For A European Federal Union: Some Ideas Using The Public-Choice Approach," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 403-438, December.
    2. Charles Blankart, 2000. "The Process of Government Centralization: A Constitutional View," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 27-39, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Roger Congleton & Andreas Kyriacou & Jordi Bacaria, 2003. "A Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 167-190, September.
    2. Jan Schnellenbach & Lars Feld & Christoph Schaltegger, 2010. "The impact of referendums on the centralisation of public goods provision: a political economy approach," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 3-26, February.
    3. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, "undated". "Direct Democracy: Designing a Living Constitution," IEW - Working Papers 167, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    4. Frey, Bruno S. & Eichenberger, Reiner, 1996. "FOCJ: Competitive governments for Europe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 315-327, September.
    5. Frey, Bruno S., 2004. "Direct Democracy for a Living Constitution," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 04/5, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    6. Thomas Döring & Jan Schnellenbach, 2011. "A tale of two federalisms: Germany, the United States and the ubiquity of centralization," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 83-102, March.
    7. Roger Congleton, 2013. "On the inevitability of divided government and improbability of a complete separation of powers," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 177-198, September.
    8. Paolo Dardanelli & Sean Mueller, 2019. "Dynamic De/Centralization in Switzerland, 1848–2010," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 49(1), pages 138-165.
    9. Christoph A. Schaltegger & Lars P. Feld, 2001. "On Government Centralization and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland," CESifo Working Paper Series 615, CESifo.
    10. Bruno S. Frey, 2009. "A New Concept of European Federalism," Europe in Question Discussion Paper Series of the London School of Economics (LEQs) 3, London School of Economics / European Institute.
    11. Lorenz Blume & Stefan Voigt, 2011. "Federalism and decentralization—a critical survey of frequently used indicators," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 238-264, September.
    12. Voßwinkel, Jan, 2007. "Die (Un-)Ordnung des deutschen Föderalismus: Überlegungen zu einer konstitutionenökonomischen Analyse," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 07/1, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    13. Lars Feld, 2005. "The European constitution project from the perspective of constitutional political economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 417-448, March.
    14. Friedrich Schneider & Hans Pitlik & Harald Strotmann & Günther Schmid, 2001. "On the politicization of intergovernmental fiscal relations in Germany after unification," Economics working papers 2001-05, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    15. Dennis Mueller, 1996. "Constitutional quandaries in Europe," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 293-302, December.
    16. Schaltegger, Christoph A & Kuttel, Dominique, 2002. "Exit, Voice, and Mimicking Behavior: Evidence from Swiss Cantons," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(1-2), pages 1-23, October.
    17. Lars P. Feld & Jan Schnellenbach & Christoph A Schaltegger, 2004. "On Government Centralization and Fiscal Referendums: A Theoretical Model and Evidence from Switzerland," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200419, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    18. Feld, Lars P. & Schaltegger, Christoph A. & Schnellenbach, Jan, 2008. "On government centralization and fiscal referendums," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 611-645, May.
    19. Frey, Bruno S. & Eichenberger, Reiner, 1996. "To harmonize or to compete? That's not the question," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 335-349, June.
    20. Alexander Fink & Thomas Stratmann, 2011. "Institutionalized Bailouts and Fiscal Policy: Consequences of Soft Budget Constraints," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 366-395, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    European unification; flexibility; diversity; systems competition; national states;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • P4 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:doi:10.1628/fa-2018-0022. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Wolpert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/fa .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.