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Managing reputation: Evidence from biographies of corporate directors

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  • Gow, Ian D.
  • Wahid, Aida Sijamic
  • Yu, Gwen

Abstract

We examine how directors’ reputations are managed through disclosure choices. We focus on disclosures in the director biographies filed with the SEC. We find that a directorship on another board is more likely to be undisclosed when the other firm experienced an adverse event—such as an accounting restatement, securities litigation, or bankruptcy—during the director's tenure. Withholding such information is associated with a more favorable stock price reaction to the director's appointment and the loss of fewer subsequent directorships. These findings suggest that reputation concerns lead to strategic disclosure choices that have real consequences in capital and labor markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Gow, Ian D. & Wahid, Aida Sijamic & Yu, Gwen, 2018. "Managing reputation: Evidence from biographies of corporate directors," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 448-469.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:66:y:2018:i:2:p:448-469
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.08.009
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    Cited by:

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    2. Street, Daniel A. & Hermanson, Dana R., 2019. "How do restatements affect outside directors and boards? A review of the literature," Journal of Accounting Literature, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 19-46.
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    7. Liang, Chuchu, 2024. "Advertising rivalry and discretionary disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1).
    8. Lindsay Baran & Silu Cheng, 2024. "Director awards and board effectiveness," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 64(1), pages 41-73, March.
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