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NASA Funding in Congress: Money Matters

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Machay

    (Mendel University in Brno, Czech Republic)

  • Alan Steinberg

    (West Houston Association, United States of America)

Abstract

This paper argues that individual members of Congress engage in economic opportunism, voting in the best interests of their constituents based on economic heuristics, when considering space policy legislation. Multivariable logit analysis is conducted on five votes in the House of Representatives to test the hypotheses. The economic opportunism effect is captured in the models by the presence of NASA Centers, relative importance of space industry and NASA procurements. Findings suggest that economic benefits to a member's constituency can play an important role in legislative voting, particularly when legislation deals with federal aerospace funding, when space policy bills lack over-reaching bi-partisan support. In recent years the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has seen its funding fall prey to partisan budget battles and party line voting, but this was not historically the norm. As we move forward into a future where NASA funding may become more scrutinized and politicized, this paper supports the thesis that individual members of Congress care more about the funds for their constituents than the other aspects of space policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Machay & Alan Steinberg, 2020. "NASA Funding in Congress: Money Matters," European Journal of Business Science and Technology, Mendel University in Brno, Faculty of Business and Economics, vol. 6(1), pages 5-20.
    • Handle: RePEc:men:journl:v:6:y:2020:i:1:p:5-20
    DOI: 10.11118/ejobsat.2020.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kau, James B & Rubin, Paul H, 1979. "Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 365-384, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    space policy; economic opportunism; legislative behavior; NASA; budgeting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • K39 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Other
    • Z18 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Public Policy

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