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Was bedeuten die Vertrauensguteigenschaften der Jahresabschlussprüfung für die Regulierung der Wirtschaftsprüferhaftung?

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  • Ritzer-Angerer Petra

    (ifo-Institut MünchenPoschingerstr.5, 81679MünchenDeutschland)

Abstract

The annual audit is the auditors’ main activity. It includes risk analysis, planning and execution. Credence goods are special goods or services whose suppliers have superior information about the quality, e. g. therapies or repairs. The customer cannot evaluate whether the service was appropriate. As the audit is sophisticated and a professional act, it is reasonable to assume that the auditor is better informed. Hence the audit can be considered a credence good. This article discusses two questions: Does the audit comply with the characteristics of credence goods and can regulation – especially of the auditor’s liability – mitigate the audit market problems caused by this?

Suggested Citation

  • Ritzer-Angerer Petra, 2020. "Was bedeuten die Vertrauensguteigenschaften der Jahresabschlussprüfung für die Regulierung der Wirtschaftsprüferhaftung?," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 69(2), pages 89-119, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:69:y:2020:i:2:p:89-119:n:3
    DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2020-2031
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    information economics; audit; auditor; credence good; efficiency; Informationsökonomik; Jahresabschlussprüfung; Wirtschaftsprüfer; Vertrauensgut (Credence Good); Effizienzverluste; information economics; audit; auditor; credence good; efficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • M4 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting
    • M42 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Auditing
    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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