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Asymmetrische Information auf dem Handwerksmarkt – eine qualitative Analyse

Author

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  • Proeger Till

    (Volkswirtschaftliches Institut für Mittelstand und Handwerk an der Universität Göttingenifh Göttingen, Heinrich-Düker-Weg 637073 GöttingenGermanyTel.: (0551) 39 174884Göttingen, Germany)

  • Rupieper Li Kathrin

    (Volkswirtschaftliches Institut für Mittelstand und Handwerk an der Universität Göttingenifh Göttingen, Heinrich-Düker-Weg 637073 GöttingenGermanyTel.: (0551) 39 174884Göttingen, Germany)

Abstract

The code of craft regulation constitutes the legal base for craft and trade occupations in Germany. Resulting from a deregulation in 2004, the requirement to obtain a degree of higher occupational training, which used to be obligatory for founding a business, was dropped for about half of the occupations regulated by this code. While this deregulation has been frequently analyzed from a competition economics’ perspective, evidence regarding the information economics’ aspect of this deregulation is lacking. It is of particular relevance whether the deregulation fostered market failures due to “market-for-lemons” issues or, to the contrary, whether market-endogenous information instruments have emerged – a question located at the pivot of the economic discussion of the craft regulation. This study uses a qualitative research approach and analyzes 268 interviews with firms and customers on craft fairs to examine informational asymmetries on the market for craft services as well as market instruments for their compensation. We find evidence that strong informational asymmetries exist and are compensated by regional reputation building of firms. Further, we show that no formal informational mechanisms have emerged that could determine service quality ex ante. Based upon those results, suggestions for the further study of the informational properties of the craft market are presented.

Suggested Citation

  • Proeger Till & Rupieper Li Kathrin, 2019. "Asymmetrische Information auf dem Handwerksmarkt – eine qualitative Analyse," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 68(2), pages 149-182, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:68:y:2019:i:2:p:149-182:n:2
    DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2019-2010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Thonipara, Anita & Proeger, Till & Bizer, Kilian, 2019. "Strukturanalyse zur Digitalisierung des Handwerks in Südniedersachsen," Göttinger Beiträge zur Handwerksforschung 30, Volkswirtschaftliches Institut für Mittelstand und Handwerk an der Universität Göttingen (ifh).
    2. Proeger, Till & Thonipara, Anita & Bizer, Kilian, 2019. "Homepage-Nutzung im Handwerk: Eine sektorale und regionale Analyse," Göttinger Beiträge zur Handwerksforschung 27, Volkswirtschaftliches Institut für Mittelstand und Handwerk an der Universität Göttingen (ifh).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Craft and Trade; Information Asymmetries; Interviews; Market-for-Lemons; Reputation; Handwerk; Informationsasymmetrien; Interviews; Market-for-Lemons; Reputation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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