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A bőség zavara: tökéletlen fogyasztói információ és verseny a háziorvosi szolgáltatások piacán
[The confusion of plenty: imperfect consumer information and competition on the market of family doctor services]

Author

Listed:
  • Gál, Róbert Iván
  • Csaba, Iván

Abstract

A tanulmány a magyar háziorvosi szolgáltatás példáján igyekszik bemutatni azt, hogy a tökéletlen fogyasztói informáltság miként fékezheti a verseny kibontakozását. A szerzők empirikus elemzés segítségével vizsgálják annak lehetőségét, hogy az információs költségek hatására a verseny intenzitása a piac méretének, illetve a háziorvosok számának növekedésével a várakozások ellenére nem erősödik, sőt gyengülhet. Röviden ismertetik a hipotézisük alapjául szolgáló elméleti hátteret. Majd bemutatják az elvégzett empirikus vizsgálat eredményeit, s megfogalmaznak néhány normatív jellegű következtetést.

Suggested Citation

  • Gál, Róbert Iván & Csaba, Iván, 1997. "A bőség zavara: tökéletlen fogyasztói információ és verseny a háziorvosi szolgáltatások piacán [The confusion of plenty: imperfect consumer information and competition on the market of family docto," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 673-686.
  • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:444
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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