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Jegybankfüggetlenség Magyarországon (19901999)
[Central-bank independence in Hungary (19901999)]

Author

Listed:
  • Karádi, Péter

Abstract

A szerző arra keresi a választ, hogy milyen tényezők biztosították a jegybankfüggetlenség magyarországi megerősödését annak ellenére, hogy minden választási periódusban új pártkoalíció került kormányzati pozícióba. Állítása szerint 1991 és 1995 között az igen magas szintű formális függetlenség ellenére a jegybank még nem jelentett számottevő korlátot a kormány gazdaságpolitikai döntései számára. 1995-ben a Bokros-csomag részeként bevezetett csúszó leértékelő árfolyamrendszer más kormányzati elkötelezettségekkel együtt azonban már jelentősen hozzájárult az intézmény megerősödéséhez. A cikk egy egyszerű politikai gazdaságtani modellen keresztül mutatja be, hogy tökéletlen intézményes kötelezettségek (mint a csúszó leértékelő árfolyamrendszer bevezetése vagy egy konzervatív jegybankelnök kinevezése) a gazdasági szereplők számára nyújtott jelzésfunkciójukon keresztül hogyan maradhatnak sikeresek egy megosztott és instabil politikai rendszerben is.

Suggested Citation

  • Karádi, Péter, 1999. "Jegybankfüggetlenség Magyarországon (19901999) [Central-bank independence in Hungary (19901999)]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 969-992.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:286
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eijffinger,Sylvester C. W. & Huizinga,Harry P. (ed.), 1998. "Positive Political Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521572156, September.
    2. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    3. Fischer, Stanley, 1993. "The role of macroeconomic factors in growth," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 485-512, December.
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    5. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
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    Cited by:

    1. Szabolcs Szikszai & Tamás Badics & Csilla Raffai & Zsolt Stenger & András Tóthmihály, 2013. "Studies in Financial Systems No 8 Hungary," FESSUD studies fstudy08, Financialisation, Economy, Society & Sustainable Development (FESSUD) Project.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E11 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Marxian; Sraffian; Kaleckian

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