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Egyoldali párosítási piacok nehézségi eredményei magasabb dimenzióban
[Hardness results of one-sided matching markets in higher dimensions]

Author

Listed:
  • Kondor, Gábor

Abstract

Az egyoldali párosítási piacok tekintetében az irodalom nagyrészt kétfős párok létrehozását vizsgálja. A gyakorlati problémáknál - mint például a vese csere prog ra mok vagy a szobatársak beosztása - ugyanakkor előfordul, hogy háromfős vagy nagyobb csoportok létrehozása a feladat. A vesecserékre található olyan gyakorlati megoldás, amely súlyozott párosítási feladatra vezethető vissza. Ez alapján meghatározunk egy gráfparticionálási problémával ekvivalens megoldást, amelynek eredménye Pareto-hatékony. Megmutatjuk, hogy a felírt gráf particio ná lási és - ezek speciális eseteként - az egyenletes klaszterezési feladatok megoldása magasabb dimenzióban, vagyis legalább háromfős csoportok kialakítására általánosan NP-nehéz. A gyakorlatban ez azt jelenti, hogy bár biztosan tudjuk, hogy e problémákra létezik optimális megoldás, azt a résztvevők nagyobb száma esetén - jelen ismereteink szerint - képtelenek vagyunk meghatározni.* Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: C78, D47.

Suggested Citation

  • Kondor, Gábor, 2022. "Egyoldali párosítási piacok nehézségi eredményei magasabb dimenzióban [Hardness results of one-sided matching markets in higher dimensions]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 825-840.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:2061
    DOI: 10.18414/KSZ.2022.7-8.825
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Atay, Ata & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2021. "A bargaining set for roommate problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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