The axiomatic characterization of majority voting and scoring rules
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Cited by:
- Csató, László, 2021. "Pontozási rendszerek szimulációs összehasonlítása [A simulatory comparison of the points systems]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 847-862.
- Martin Lackner & Piotr Skowron, 2017. "Consistent Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules," Papers 1704.02453, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2019.
- László Csató, 2023. "A comparative study of scoring systems by simulations," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 24(4), pages 526-545, May.
- Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2017.
"The greatest unhappiness of the least number,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(3), pages 637-655, December.
- Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2016. "The greatest unhappiness of the least number," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(1), pages 187-205, June.
- Skowron, Piotr & Faliszewski, Piotr & Slinko, Arkadii, 2019. "Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 244-273.
- L'aszl'o Csat'o, 2021. "A comparative study of scoring systems by simulations," Papers 2101.05744, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
- Giulia Bernardi & Roberto Lucchetti & Stefano Moretti, 2019. "Ranking objects from a preference relation over their subsets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(4), pages 589-606, April.
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Keywords
majority voting; scoring rules; axiomatic characterization;All these keywords.
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