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Független költségvetési intézmények fejlődése a 2008-as válság után
[Development of independent fiscal institutions since the crisis of 2008]

Author

Listed:
  • Bethlendi, András
  • Lentner, Csaba
  • Póra, András

Abstract

A 2008-as globális pénzügyi és világgazdasági válság sok országban költségvetési válsággá alakult át, amire válaszul elterjedt a szabályalapú költségvetési politika. A tanulmány a szabályalapú költségvetési politika egyik legfontosabb intézményét, a független költségvetési intézményeket veszi górcső alá. A kulcskérdésünk: ezen intézmények elterjedése csupán az Európai Unió szupranacionális költségvetési előírásai miatti európai jelenség, vagy globális - így a modern, válság utáni költségvetési politika szükségszerű eleme. A leíró statisztika és a klaszterelemzés alapján egyaránt két, markánsan elkülönülő csoportot tudtunk meghatározni: egy európai uniós és egy nem európai uniós klasztert, néhány speciális esettel. Összességében elmondható, hogy a független költségvetési intézmények elterjedése inkább az Európai Unió szabályozási keretrendszerével van összefüggésben, mintsem egy globális szükségszerűség következménye. Ezt a trendet a 2020. év elején kibontakozó új világgazdasági válság felülírhatja. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: E02, E62, F34, F36, H30, H60, H61, H63, H68, P50.

Suggested Citation

  • Bethlendi, András & Lentner, Csaba & Póra, András, 2020. "Független költségvetési intézmények fejlődése a 2008-as válság után [Development of independent fiscal institutions since the crisis of 2008]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 787-808.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1919
    DOI: 10.18414/KSZ.2020.7-8.787
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    6. Charles Wyplosz, 2002. "Fiscal Policy: Institutions vs. Rules," IHEID Working Papers 03-2002, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    7. Niels D. Gilbert & Jasper F.M. Jong, 2017. "Do European fiscal rules induce a bias in fiscal forecasts? Evidence from the Stability and Growth Pact," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(1), pages 1-32, January.
    8. Michal Horvath, 2018. "EU Independent Fiscal Institutions: An Assessment of Potential Effectiveness," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(3), pages 504-519, April.
    9. Adam Geršl & Martina Jašová & Jan Zápal, 2014. "Fiscal Councils and Economic Volatility," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 64(3), pages 190-212, June.
    10. Martin Larch & Thomas Braendle, 2018. "Independent Fiscal Councils: Neglected Siblings of Independent Central Banks? An EU Perspective," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 267-283, March.
    11. Viral V. Acharya & Sascha Steffen, 2017. "The Importance of a Banking Union and Fiscal Union for a Capital Markets Union," European Economy - Discussion Papers 062, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jankovics, László, 2021. "Költségvetési tanácsok az EU-ban - ölebek, vérebek vagy őrkutyák? [Fiscal councils in the EU: lapdogs, watchdogs or bloodhounds?]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(3), pages 251-281.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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