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Versengő együttműködés versus összejátszás, avagy hálózati szintű csalás?
[Coopetition versus collusion, or fraud at network level?]

Author

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  • Jóna, György

Abstract

A cikk arra keresi a választ, hogy kialakulhat-e koopetitív hálózatban (riválisok hálózatszerű együttműködésében) a kollúzió (a piaci versenyre káros összejátszás). A kérdés megválaszolására húsz rivális pékségből álló, informálisan működő gdañski koopetitív hálózatot vizsgáltunk 40 héten át. A longitudinális vizsgálat legfontosabb kérdése az volt, hogy kollúzió vagy koopetíció hatására módosult a kenyér átlagos eladási ára a hálózatban. A primer, idősoros adatbázist hálózat- gazdaságtani és ökonometriai módszerek szintetizálásával dolgoztuk fel. Az eredmények szerint a gdañski pékségek hálózatában nem jött létre összejátszás, így a piaci verseny és automatizmusok nem torzultak. Fontos, hogy a hálózat szereplői kiadásaikat és nyereségüket stagnáló árrés, ám növekvő haszonkulcs mellett tudták optimalizálni, ami a fogyasztói és eladói oldal hasznosságát egyaránt javítja.* Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: D22, D85, L1, L14, P13.

Suggested Citation

  • Jóna, György, 2020. "Versengő együttműködés versus összejátszás, avagy hálózati szintű csalás? [Coopetition versus collusion, or fraud at network level?]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 164-180.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1889
    DOI: 10.18414/KSZ.2020.2.164
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • P13 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Cooperative Enterprises

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