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Az újraelosztáshoz horgonyzott államháztartási hiány
[Deficit anchored to redistribution]

Author

Listed:
  • Csillag, István

Abstract

A szerző az államháztartási hiány újratermelődésének okát a kialakult újraelosztási ráta fenntartásában érdekelt választói magatartásban, azoknak a választóknak a relatív többségben látja, akiknek jövedelme közvetlenül az állami, politikai döntésektől függ. A tanulmány politikai gazdaságtani megközelítésben bemutatja, hogy a választók - mint megbízók - a mindenkori kormánynak - mint érdekükben eljáró ügynöknek - a lehetséges mozgásterét egyfelől az újraelosztás kialakult mértékének megtartásához, másfelől a jövedelmek centralizációs hányadának kialakult arányához horgonyozzák le. A kormánynak mint ügynöknek ebben a keretben kell manővereznie, ami a szándékoktól függetlenül is a deficit tartósságához vezet. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: O43, E02, O16, P36, P51.

Suggested Citation

  • Csillag, István, 2013. "Az újraelosztáshoz horgonyzott államháztartási hiány [Deficit anchored to redistribution]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 1234-1258.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1432
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • P36 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Consumer Economics; Health; Education and Training; Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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