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A társadalmi döntések számítástudománya - egy új határterület. European Future Technologies Conference and Exhibition (FET'11) COMSOC (Computational Social Choice) szekció MTA Közgazdaságtudományi Intézete, Budapest, 2011. május 4
[The science of calculating social decisions - a new marginal field. European Future Technologies Conference and Exhibition (FET'11) COMSOC section]

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  • Biró, Péter

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  • Biró, Péter, 2011. "A társadalmi döntések számítástudománya - egy új határterület. European Future Technologies Conference and Exhibition (FET'11) COMSOC (Computational Social Choice) szekció MTA Közgazdaságtudományi Int," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 709-715.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1262
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Puppe, Clemens & Tasnádi, Attila, 2009. "Optimal redistricting under geographical constraints: Why "pack and crack" does not work," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 93-96, October.
    2. Alvin Roth, 2008. "Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.
    3. Kóczy, L.Á., 2006. "Strategic power indices: quarrelling in coalitions," Research Memorandum 049, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    4. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
    5. Kóczy Á., László, 2010. "A magyarországi felvételi rendszerek sajátosságai [Specific features of Hungarys system of school and university admissions]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 142-164.
    6. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
    7. Kóczy Á., László, 2009. "Központi felvételi rendszerek. Taktikázás és stabilitás [Central admission systems. Stratagems and stability]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(5), pages 422-442.
    8. Tamas Fleiner & Balazs Sziklai, 2011. "Notes on the Bankruptcy Problem: an Application of Hydraulic Rationing," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1123, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
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