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A dominanciaproblémák tényeinek értelmezése és a közgazdaság-tudományi módszertan
[Interpretation of the facts of dominance problems and the methodology of economics]

Author

Listed:
  • Török, Ádám

Abstract

A cikk a versenyszabályozás közgazdaságtanának egyik nagy gyakorlati jelentőségű területével, a dominanciaproblémák elemzésével kapcsolatban tekinti át a megfigyelt tények különböző, egymásnak akár ellentmondó, de egyaránt egzaktnak tekinthető interpretációs lehetőségeit. Elsősorban az amerikai versenyjogi gyakorlat egyik legutóbbi híres esete, a "böngészőügy" feldolgozásával próbálja megvilágítani a verseny tényei önmagában való (per se) és mérlegelés szerinti (rule of reason) értelmezésének közgazdasági hátterét. A tanulmány a dominanciaügyek értékelésének módszertanával kapcsolatos megjegyzésekkel zárul. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: B40, K21, L41.

Suggested Citation

  • Török, Ádám, 2011. "A dominanciaproblémák tényeinek értelmezése és a közgazdaság-tudományi módszertan [Interpretation of the facts of dominance problems and the methodology of economics]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 41-55.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1217
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B40 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - General
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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