IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/theord/v82y2017i1d10.1007_s11238-016-9563-y.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Resolute majority rules

Author

Listed:
  • Hyewon Jeong

    (Seoul National University
    Washington University in St. Louis)

  • Biung-Ghi Ju

    (Seoul National University)

Abstract

We investigate resolute voting rules that always rank two alternatives strictly and avoid social indecision. Resolute majority rules differ from the standard majority rule in that whenever both alternatives win the same number of votes, a tie-breaking function is used to determine the outcome. We provide axiomatic characterizations of resolute majority rules or resolute majority rules with a quorum. Resoluteness axiom is used in all these results. The other axioms are weaker than those considered in the characterization of the majority rule by May (1952 Econometrica, 20:680–684). In particular, instead of May’s positive responsiveness, we consider a much weaker monotonicity axiom.

Suggested Citation

  • Hyewon Jeong & Biung-Ghi Ju, 2017. "Resolute majority rules," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 82(1), pages 31-39, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:82:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11238-016-9563-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-016-9563-y
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11238-016-9563-y
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11238-016-9563-y?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Garcia-Lapresta, Jose Luis & Llamazares, Bonifacio, 2001. "Majority decisions based on difference of votes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 463-481, June.
    2. Houy, Nicolas, 2007. "Some further characterizations for the forgotten voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 111-121, January.
    3. Nicolas Houy, 2009. "A characterization of majority voting rules with quorums," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 295-301, September.
    4. Antonio Quesada, 2013. "The majority rule with a chairman," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 679-691, March.
    5. Fishburn, Peter C. & Gehrlein, William V., 1977. "Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 72-91, June.
    6. Drora Karotkin, 1996. "Justification of the simple majority and chairman rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(4), pages 479-486.
    7. Marc Pauly, 2013. "Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(4), pages 581-597, October.
    8. Llamazares, Bonifacio, 2006. "The forgotten decision rules: Majority rules based on difference of votes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 311-326, May.
    9. Nitzan, Shmuel & Paroush, Jacob, 1982. "Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(2), pages 289-297, June.
    10. Nitzan, Shmuel & Paroush, Jacob, 1981. "The characterization of decisive weighted majority rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 119-124.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2021. "Breaking ties in collective decision-making," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 44(1), pages 411-457, June.
    2. Daniela Bubboloni & Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori, 2020. "Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 151-185, April.
    3. McMorris, F.R. & Mulder, Henry Martyn & Novick, Beth & Powers, Robert C., 2021. "Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 164-174.
    4. Hiroki Saitoh, 2022. "Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 139-173, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Llamazares, Bonifacio & Pérez-Asurmendi, Patrizia, 2013. "Triple-acyclicity in majorities based on difference in support," MPRA Paper 52218, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Bonifacio Llamazares, 2013. "On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(3), pages 239-248, September.
    3. King, Sarah Schulz & Powers, Robert C., 2018. "Beyond neutrality: Extended difference of votes rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 146-152.
    4. Richard Baron & Mostapha Diss & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2015. "A geometric examination of majorities based on difference in support," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 123-153, June.
    5. Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2015. "Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes," Working Papers 1533, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    6. José Luis Garcí a-Lapresta & Bonifacio Llamazares, 2010. "Preference Intensities and Majority Decisions Based on Difference of Support Between Alternatives," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 19(6), pages 527-542, November.
    7. Marc Pauly, 2013. "Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(4), pages 581-597, October.
    8. Sven Berg & Antonio Marañon, 2001. "Collective Decisional Skill and Decisive Voting Games - Some Results," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 10(5), pages 389-403, September.
    9. Karotkin, Drora, 1998. "The Network of Weighted Majority Rules and Weighted Majority Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 299-315, February.
    10. Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2016. "Probabilities of Consistent Election Outcomes with Majorities Based on Difference in Support," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(5), pages 967-994, September.
    11. Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2016. "Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(3), pages 473-494, March.
    12. Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, 2015. "Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes," Working Papers halshs-01241996, HAL.
    13. Hiroki Saitoh, 2022. "Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 139-173, July.
    14. Karotkin, D. & Nitzan, S., 1993. "Some Peculiarities of Group Decision Making in Teams," Discussion Paper 1993-3, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    15. Houy, Nicolas, 2007. "Some further characterizations for the forgotten voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 111-121, January.
    16. McMorris, F.R. & Mulder, Henry Martyn & Novick, Beth & Powers, Robert C., 2021. "Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 164-174.
    17. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:4:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Ronald Britto, 2000. "Committee Decision Making: The Multicategory Case," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 66(3), pages 764-769, January.
    19. NAKADA, Satoshi & NITZAN, Shmuel & UI, Takashi & 宇井, 貴志, 2017. "Robust Voting under Uncertainty," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-60, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
    20. Karotkin, D. & Nitzan, S., 1993. "Some Peculiarities of Group Decision Making in Teams," Other publications TiSEM 134d73b3-65fc-490c-9592-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    21. Rodríguez Alcantud, José Carlos & Laruelle, Annick, 2016. "To disqualify or not to qualify: This is the other question," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Majority rule; Majority rule with a quorum; Resoluteness; Neutrality; Monotonicity; Positive responsiveness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:82:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11238-016-9563-y. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.