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Coalitional Interval Games for Strategic Games in Which Players Cooperate

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  • Luisa Carpente
  • Balbina Casas-Méndez
  • Ignacio García-Jurado
  • Anne Nouweland

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Suggested Citation

  • Luisa Carpente & Balbina Casas-Méndez & Ignacio García-Jurado & Anne Nouweland, 2008. "Coalitional Interval Games for Strategic Games in Which Players Cooperate," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 253-269, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:65:y:2008:i:3:p:253-269
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-007-9091-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Demange,Gabrielle & Wooders,Myrna (ed.), 2005. "Group Formation in Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521842716, November.
    2. Brânzei, R. & Dimitrov, D.A. & Pickl, S. & Tijs, S.H., 2002. "How to Cope with Division Problems under Interval Uncertainty of Claims?," Discussion Paper 2002-96, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Gabrielle Demange & Wooders Myrna, 2005. "Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs and Coalitions," Post-Print halshs-00576778, HAL.
    4. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2003:i:9:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Luisa Carpente & Balbina Casas-Méndez & Ignacio García-Jurado & Anne van den Nouweland, 2005. "Values for strategic games in which players cooperate," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(3), pages 397-419, September.
    6. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 286-336, January.
    7. Dinko Dimitrov & Stef Tijs & Rodica Branzei, 2003. "Shapley-like values for interval bankruptcy games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(9), pages 1-8.
    8. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August.
    9. Gustavo Bergantiños & Ignacio Garcia Jurado, 1995. "Estudio comparativo de diversas funciones características asociadas a un juego en forma normal," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 19(1), pages 127-138, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Luisa Carpente & Balbina Casas-Méndez & Ignacio García-Jurado & Anne Nouweland, 2010. "The truncated core for games with upper bounds," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(4), pages 645-656, October.
    2. Lucia Pusillo, 2013. "Banzhaf LikeValue for Games with Interval Uncertainty," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 005-014, March.
    3. Chunqiao Tan & Wenrui Feng & Weibin Han, 2020. "On the Banzhaf-like Value for Cooperative Games with Interval Payoffs," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(3), pages 1-14, March.
    4. Li, Deng-Feng, 2011. "Linear programming approach to solve interval-valued matrix games," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 655-666, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    strategic games; coalitional interval games; superadditive games; axiomatic characterization; C71; C72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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