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‘‘Counting’’ power indices for games with a priori unions

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  • Marcin Malawski

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  • Marcin Malawski, 2004. "‘‘Counting’’ power indices for games with a priori unions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 125-140, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:56:y:2004:i:1:p:125-140
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-004-5640-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. van den Brink, Rene & van der Laan, Gerard, 2005. "A class of consistent share functions for games in coalition structure," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 193-212, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Badinger, Harald & Mühlböck, Monika & Nindl, Elisabeth & Reuter, Wolf Heinrich, 2014. "Theoretical vs. empirical power indices: Do preferences matter?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 158-176.
    2. Matija Kovacic & Claudio Zoli, 2021. "Ethnic distribution, effective power and conflict," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(2), pages 257-299, August.
    3. Gómez-Rúa, María & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2010. "The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 207(2), pages 795-806, December.

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