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Sophisticated Voting Under the Sequential Voting by Veto 1

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  • Fany Yuval

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  • Fany Yuval, 2002. "Sophisticated Voting Under the Sequential Voting by Veto 1," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 343-369, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:53:y:2002:i:4:p:343-369
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1024196415513
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Plott, Charles R & Levine, Michael E, 1978. "A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(1), pages 146-160, March.
    2. Rick Wilson & Anne Pearson, 1987. "Evidence of sophisticated voting in a committee setting: theory and experiments," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 255-273, September.
    3. Mueller, Dennis C., 1978. "Voting by veto," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 57-75, August.
    4. McKelvey, Richard D. & Niemi, Richard G., 1978. "A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, June.
    5. Ordeshook, Peter C. & Schwartz, Thomas, 1987. "Agendas and the Control of Political Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 179-199, March.
    6. Moulin, Herve, 1981. "Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 398-412, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Laslier, Jean-François & Núñez, Matías & Remzi Sanver, M., 2021. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    2. Michael Filzmoser & Johannes R. Gettinger, 2019. "Offer and veto: an experimental comparison of two negotiation procedures," EURO Journal on Decision Processes, Springer;EURO - The Association of European Operational Research Societies, vol. 7(1), pages 83-99, May.
    3. Hortala-Vallve, Rafael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2010. "A simple mechanism for resolving conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 375-391, November.
    4. Sauermann, Jan & Beckmann, Paul, 2019. "The influence of group size on distributional fairness under voting by veto," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 90-102.
    5. Dan S. Felsenthal, 2017. "Comment on “Proposals for a Democracy of the Future” by Bruno Frey," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 195-200, November.
    6. Van der Linden, Martin, 2017. "Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 111-121.
    7. Jan Sauermann, 2021. "The effects of communication on the occurrence of the tyranny of the majority under voting by veto," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(1), pages 1-20, January.
    8. Novikova, Natalia M. & Pospelova, Irina I., 2017. "A lemma in open sequential voting by veto," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 141-144.

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