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Bargaining with Incomplete information an axiomatic approach

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  • Joachim Rosenmüller

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  • Joachim Rosenmüller, 1997. "Bargaining with Incomplete information an axiomatic approach," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 105-146, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:42:y:1997:i:2:p:105-146
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1004907606204
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Weidner, Frank, 1992. "The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution and Incentive Compatible Mechanisms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 21(2), pages 109-129.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rosenmüller, Joachim, 2017. "Mechanisms in the core of a fee game," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 303, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.

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