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Regulatory Learning in the Face of Net Zero Climate Policy: The Case of the UK

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Duma

    (Stockholm Environment Institute
    Centre on Regulation in Europe)

  • Michael G. Pollitt

    (Centre on Regulation in Europe
    University of Cambridge)

  • Andrei Covatariu

    (Centre on Regulation in Europe
    Energy Policy Group)

Abstract

In this paper we explore further how energy network regulation might better be adapted to the uncertainty challenges that are raised by net zero climate policy. We do this with specific reference to energy regulation in the UK. We discuss the drivers of change and the nature of the uncertainty that is faced by energy regulators. Next, we examine theories of dynamic/responsive/adaptive regulation for lessons that regulators can learn in the light of net zero. We look for regulatory learning from water regulators in Scotland and England and Wales and airport regulation in London. Drawing on evidence from a recent consultation with 41 stakeholder responses, we explore how energy regulation might need to change in the areas of planning, uncertainty mechanisms, regulatory incentives, financing arrangements, stakeholder engagement, innovation processes, and industry governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Duma & Michael G. Pollitt & Andrei Covatariu, 2024. "Regulatory Learning in the Face of Net Zero Climate Policy: The Case of the UK," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 65(2), pages 505-530, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:65:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s11151-024-09972-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09972-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic regulation; Responsive regulation; Adaptive regulation; Uncertainty; Net zero;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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