IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/revind/v57y2020i4d10.1007_s11151-020-09790-y.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Recent Developments at the CMA: 2019–2020

Author

Listed:
  • Richard Havell

    (Competition and Markets Authority
    Lochrin Square)

  • Chris Jenkins

    (Competition and Markets Authority
    Lochrin Square)

  • James Rutt

    (Competition and Markets Authority
    Lochrin Square)

  • Elliott Scanlon

    (Competition and Markets Authority
    Lochrin Square)

  • Paul Tregear

    (Competition and Markets Authority
    Lochrin Square)

  • Mike Walker

    (Competition and Markets Authority
    Lochrin Square)

Abstract

We discuss three important cases that the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has completed over the past year: First, the coronavirus pandemic has had implications for a wide range of the CMA’s work; we describe the work on price gouging conducted by the CMA’s Covid-19 taskforce and respond to the argument that competition authorities should not be concerned about such behaviour. Second, a number of high-profile studies have considered the appropriate application of competition policy in digital industries. The second two cases—the Online Platforms and Digital Advertising market study, and the Google/Looker merger—show the work the CMA has continued to do in this area.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Havell & Chris Jenkins & James Rutt & Elliott Scanlon & Paul Tregear & Mike Walker, 2020. "Recent Developments at the CMA: 2019–2020," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 57(4), pages 721-749, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:57:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s11151-020-09790-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-020-09790-y
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11151-020-09790-y
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11151-020-09790-y?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, 2005. "Excessive Prices: Using Economics to Define Administrable Legal Rules," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 97-122.
    2. Daniele Condorelli & Jorge Padilla, 2020. "Harnessing Platform Envelopment in the Digital World," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 143-187.
    3. Adriano Basso & Julie Bon & Bethany Tasker & Natalie Timan & Mike Walker & Chris Whitcombe, 2018. "Recent Developments at the CMA: 2017–2018," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 53(4), pages 615-635, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Adam Cellan-Jones & Hussein Farook & Riccardo Ferrari & Maxwell Harris & Alex Rutt & Mike Walker, 2022. "Recent Developments at the CMA: 2021–22," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 61(4), pages 381-403, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Repullo, Rafael & Elizalde, Abel, 2004. "Economic and Regulatory Capital: What is the Difference?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4770, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Suarez, Javier & Ceron, Jose A., 2006. "Hot and Cold Housing Markets: International Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 5411, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Svetlana Avdasheva & Dina Korneeva, 2017. "Why Enforcement against Excessive Pricing in the Russian Federation is not Sufficiently Successful?," Public administration issues, Higher School of Economics, issue 5, pages 117-133.
    4. Eduardo Saavedra & Javier Tapia, 2019. "El control de los precios excesivos en el derecho de la libre competencia: análisis y propuesta," Estudios Públicos, Centro de Estudios Públicos, vol. 0(153), pages 95-140.
    5. Axel Gautier & Nicolas Petit, 2018. "Optimal enforcement of competition policy: the commitments procedure under uncertainty," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 195-224, April.
    6. Patrice Bougette & Oliver Budzinski & Frédéric Marty, 2019. "Exploitative Abuse and Abuse of Economic Dependence: What Can We Learn From an Industrial Organization Approach?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 129(2), pages 261-286.
    7. Javier Díaz-Giménez & Josep Pijoan-Mas, 2006. "Flat Tax Reforms in the U.S.: A Boon for the Income Poor," Working Papers wp2006_0611, CEMFI.
    8. Ernesto Rengifo García & Francisco E. Beneke Ávila, 2021. "Los derechos de propiedad intelectual y la libre competencia," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 1301.
    9. Martin Peitz, 2024. "The Economic Theory of Two-Sided Platforms," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_584, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    10. Jullien, Bruno & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2021. "The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    11. Gilo, David & Spiegel, Yossi, 2018. "The antitrust prohibition of excessive pricing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 503-541.
    12. Claudio Calcagno & Mike Walker, 2010. "Excessive Pricing: Towards Clarity And Economic Coherence," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(4), pages 891-910.
    13. Wolfgang Kerber & Karsten K. Zolna, 2021. "The German Facebook Case: The Law and Economics of the Relationship between Competition and Data Protection Law," MAGKS Papers on Economics 202114, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    14. Pinar Akman & Luke Garrod, 2011. "When Are Excessive Prices Unfair?," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 403-426.
    15. Avdasheva, Svetlana & Kryuchkova, Polina, 2015. "The ‘reactive’ model of antitrust enforcement: When private interests dictate enforcement actions – The Russian case," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 200-208.
    16. Juan-José Ganuza & Gerard Llobet & Beatriz Domínguez, 2009. "R& D in the Pharmaceutical Industry: A World of Small Innovations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(4), pages 539-551, April.
    17. Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, 2006. "Competition Policy With Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead Of “Per Se Rules Vs Rule Of Reason”," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 215-244.
    18. Martin Peitz, 2023. "Governance and Regulation of Platforms," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_480, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    19. Aleix Calveras & Juan-José Ganuza & Gerard Llobet, 2005. "Regulation and Opportunism: How Much Activism Do We Need?," Working Papers wp2005_0508, CEMFI.
    20. Yannis Katsoulacos & David Ulph, 2009. "On Optimal Legal Standards For Competition Policy: A General Welfare‐Based Analysis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 410-437, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:57:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s11151-020-09790-y. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.