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Managerial Control and Executive Compensation

Author

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  • F. M. Scherer

    (Harvard University (Emeritus))

Abstract

This article analyzes the trajectory and causes of the explosion of American corporate CEOs’ compensation relative to that of average workers between 1958 and 2017. The historical data are presented and analyzed in more detail for 2016 and 2017. Important biases in alternative data sets are explored. Alternative hypotheses for the dramatic changes over time are proposed but not resolved. Among other things, the paper investigates the role of tax and other government policy changes and regulation-induced innovations in the organization of executive pay determination.

Suggested Citation

  • F. M. Scherer, 2020. "Managerial Control and Executive Compensation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 56(2), pages 315-327, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:56:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s11151-019-09691-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-019-09691-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kelly Shue & Richard R. Townsend, 2017. "How Do Quasi†Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk†Taking?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 72(6), pages 2551-2588, December.
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    3. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 49-70, Summer.
    4. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," NBER Working Papers 9784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1973. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 637-654, May-June.
    6. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
    7. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, 2010. "CEO Incentives—It's Not How Much You Pay, But How," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 64-76, January.
    8. F. Scherer, 2006. "A New Retrospective on Mergers," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 28(4), pages 327-341, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Douglas A. Adu & Basil Al‐Najjar & Thitima Sitthipongpanich, 2022. "Executive compensation, environmental performance, and sustainable banking: The moderating effect of governance mechanisms," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 1439-1463, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; Managerial compensation; Principal–agent problem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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