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Legal Treatment of Abuse of Dominance in Indian Competition Law: Adopting an Effects-Based Approach

Author

Listed:
  • Payal Malik

    (Competition Commission of India
    University of Delhi)

  • Neha Malhotra

    (Nathan Economic Consulting India Private Limited)

  • Ramji Tamarappoo

    (Nathan Economic Consulting India Private Limited
    Nathan Associates Inc.)

  • Nisha Kaur Uberoi

    (Competition Law Practice, Trilegal)

Abstract

Abuse of dominance investigations around the world are often form-based, primarily centred on the pre-requisite of dominance. This may lead to false positives or restrict innovation in today’s dynamic and complex markets. Accordingly, abuse of dominance enforcement requires a shift towards adopting an effects-based approach, weighing pro and anticompetitive effects and considering efficiency justifications. The European Union is increasingly moving in this direction, as is demonstrated by its case law that is analysed in this paper. The paper also explores competition law in India—traditionally a form-based jurisdiction for abuse of dominance investigations—and finds an encouraging trend towards an effects-based approach.

Suggested Citation

  • Payal Malik & Neha Malhotra & Ramji Tamarappoo & Nisha Kaur Uberoi, 2019. "Legal Treatment of Abuse of Dominance in Indian Competition Law: Adopting an Effects-Based Approach," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(2), pages 435-464, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:54:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s11151-018-9651-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-018-9651-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Frédéric Marty, 2014. "Towards an Economics of Convention-based Approach of the European Competition Policy," GREDEG Working Papers 2014-06, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
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    4. Flavio Felice & Massimiliano Vatiero, 2015. "Ordo and European Competition Law," Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology, in: A Research Annual, volume 32, pages 147-157, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    5. Behrens, Peter, 2015. "The ordoliberal concept of "abuse" of a dominant position and its impact on Article 102 TFEU," Discussion Papers 7/15, Europa-Kolleg Hamburg, Institute for European Integration.
    6. Gual, Jordi & Hellwig, Martin F. & Perrot, Anne & Polo, Michele & Rey, Patrick & Schmidt, Klaus M. & Stenbacka, Rune, 2005. "An Economic Approach to Article 82," Discussion Papers in Economics 745, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yannis Katsoulacos & Svetlana Avdasheva & Svetlana Golovanova, 2021. "Determinants of the (Slow) Development of Effect-Based Competition Enforcement: Testing the Impact of Judicial Review on the Choice of Legal Standards by Competition Authorities," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 103-122, March.

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