IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/revind/v52y2018i2d10.1007_s11151-017-9590-z.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The National Collegiate Athletic Association Cartel: Why it Exists, How it Works, and What it Does

Author

Listed:
  • Allen R. Sanderson

    (University of Chicago
    Vanderbilt University
    University of Adelaide)

  • John J. Siegfried

    (University of Chicago
    Vanderbilt University
    University of Adelaide)

Abstract

In this essay we consider why American colleges and universities participate in big-time commercialized intercollegiate sports, and how sports came to play such a prominent role on American college and university campuses. We also review how the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) developed as a body to regulate player safety and transformed itself into an economic regulator, the means by which the NCAA attempts to maintain its control, increase revenues, and reduce costs for college sports programs. We also examine how the organization succeeds in the face of institutional characteristics that imply that its cartel activities would be doomed. Finally, we speculate on what changes might be on the horizon for the NCAA and college athletics.

Suggested Citation

  • Allen R. Sanderson & John J. Siegfried, 2018. "The National Collegiate Athletic Association Cartel: Why it Exists, How it Works, and What it Does," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(2), pages 185-209, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:52:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s11151-017-9590-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-017-9590-z
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11151-017-9590-z
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11151-017-9590-z?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Devin G. Pope & Jaren C. Pope, 2009. "The Impact of College Sports Success on the Quantity and Quality of Student Applications," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 75(3), pages 750-780, January.
    2. repec:ucp:bkecon:9780226253268 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Randy R Grant & John Leadley & Zenon Zygmont, 2008. "The Economics of Intercollegiate Sports," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 6172, February.
    4. Fraas, Arthur G & Greer, Douglas F, 1977. "Market Structure and Price Collusion: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(1), pages 21-44, September.
    5. Michael L. Anderson, 2012. "The Benefits of College Athletic Success: An Application of the Propensity Score Design with Instrumental Variables," NBER Working Papers 18196, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Alicia Sasser, 2008. "The future of the skilled labor force in New England: the supply of recent college graduates," Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pages 4-23.
    7. Allen R. Sanderson & John J. Siegfried, 2015. "The Case for Paying College Athletes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 29(1), pages 115-138, Winter.
    8. Marhsall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M., 2014. "The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262525941, April.
    9. Caroline M. Hoxby, 2014. "The Economics of Online Postsecondary Education: MOOCs, Nonselective Education, and Highly Selective Education," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 528-533, May.
    10. Adam Hoffer & Brad R. Humphreys & Donald J. Lacombe & Jane E. Ruseski, 2014. "The NCAA Athletics Arms Race: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 14-29, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    11. Hay, George A & Kelley, Daniel, 1974. "An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 13-38, April.
    12. Dennis Coates & Brad R. Humphreys & Li Zhou, 2014. "Reference-Dependent Preferences, Loss Aversion, And Live Game Attendance," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(3), pages 959-973, July.
    13. Clotfelter,Charles T., 2011. "Big-Time Sports in American Universities," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107004344, December.
    14. Kathleen Carroll & Brad R. Humphreys, 2016. "Opportunistic Behavior in a Cartel Setting," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 17(6), pages 601-628, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Roger D. Blair & Wenche Wang, 2018. "The NCAA Cartel and Antitrust Policy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(2), pages 351-368, March.
    2. Craig McFarland & Peter A. Groothuis & Dennis Guignet, 2024. "The role of football win percentage on college applications for Power Five and Group of Five schools," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(3), pages 474-482, July.
    3. Austin F. Eggers & Peter A. Groothuis & Parker Redding & Kurt W. Rotthoff & Michael Solimini, 2020. "Universities Behaving Badly: The Impact of Athletic Malfeasance on Student Quality and Enrollment," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 21(1), pages 87-100, January.
    4. Austin F. Eggers & Peter A. Groothuis, 2021. "The Impact of Winning an NCAA Men's Basketball or Football Championship on Academic Quality," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 41(2), pages 263-275.
    5. E. Woodrow Eckard, 2020. "The NCAA’s Graduation Success Rate: How Successful Is It?," Research in Higher Education, Springer;Association for Institutional Research, vol. 61(6), pages 780-793, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Allen R. Sanderson & John J. Siegfried, 2015. "The Case for Paying College Athletes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 29(1), pages 115-138, Winter.
    2. Christopher Avery & Brian Cadman & Gavin Cassar, 2016. "Academics vs. Athletics: Career Concerns for NCAA Division I Coaches," NBER Working Papers 22120, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Ronald W. Cotterill, 1998. "Estimation of Cost Pass Through to Michigan Consumers in the ADM Price Fixing Case," Food Marketing Policy Center Research Reports 039, University of Connecticut, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Charles J. Zwick Center for Food and Resource Policy.
    4. Connor, John M. & Bolotova, Yuliya, 2006. "Cartel overcharges: Survey and meta-analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1109-1137, November.
    5. Jerome Segura & Jonathan Willner, 2018. "The Game Is Good at the Top," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 19(5), pages 645-676, June.
    6. Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew, 2018. "Explicit vs tacit collusion: The effects of firm numbers and asymmetries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 1-25.
    7. D. Randall Smith, 2019. "The Lure of Academic and Social Reputations Versus Athletic Success: Influences on Enrollment Yield at NCAA Division I Institutions," Research in Higher Education, Springer;Association for Institutional Research, vol. 60(6), pages 870-904, September.
    8. Ari Hyytinen & Frode Steen & Otto Toivanen, 2019. "An Anatomy of Cartel Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(621), pages 2155-2191.
    9. Dick, Andrew R, 1996. "When Are Cartels Stable Contracts?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 241-283, April.
    10. World Bank Group, 2016. "South Africa Economic Update, February 2016," World Bank Publications - Reports 23762, The World Bank Group.
    11. Connor, John M., 2002. "THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL GLOBAL CARTELS OF THE 1990s: OVERVIEW AND UPDATE," Staff Papers 28631, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    12. Darai, D. & Roux, C. & Schneider, F., 2019. "Mergers, Mavericks, and Tacit Collusion," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1984, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    13. David K. Levine & Andrea Mattozzi & Salvatore Modica, 2021. "Trade Associations: Why Not Cartels?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(1), pages 47-64, February.
    14. Symeonidis, George, 1999. "In Which Industries Is Collusion More Likely?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2301, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Stephen Davies & Oindrila De, 2013. "Ringleaders in Larger Number Asymmetric Cartels," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(11), pages 524-544, November.
    16. Kühn, Kai-Uwe, 2006. "How Market Fragmentation Can Facilitate Collusion," CEPR Discussion Papers 5948, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    18. Adam G. Walker, 2015. "Division I Intercollegiate Athletics Success and the Financial Impact on Universities," SAGE Open, , vol. 5(4), pages 21582440156, October.
    19. John Charles Bradbury & Joshua D. Pitts, 2018. "Full Cost-of-Attendance Scholarships and College Choice," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 19(7), pages 977-989, October.
    20. Frank Verboben, 1997. "Localized Competition, Multimarket Operation and Collusive Behavior," CIG Working Papers FS IV 97-03, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:52:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s11151-017-9590-z. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.