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Sylvania’s Indian Precursor and Its Legacy

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  • Aditya Bhattacharjea

    (University of Delhi)

Abstract

The starting point of this paper is a January 1977 judgment of the Indian Supreme Court, which applied the rule of reason to vertical restraints and anticipated many of the arguments of the Sylvania judgment. After summarizing the background of the Indian case, I set out the main points of similarity and difference between the two judgments, and finally assess the somewhat erratic influence of post-Sylvania antitrust thinking on Indian competition law and jurisprudence.

Suggested Citation

  • Aditya Bhattacharjea, 2017. "Sylvania’s Indian Precursor and Its Legacy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 51(2), pages 173-191, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:51:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11151-017-9588-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-017-9588-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Aditya Bhattacharjea, 2008. "India'S New Competition Law: A Comparative Assessment," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(3), pages 609-638.
    2. Patrick Rey & Joseph Stiglitz, 1995. "The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 431-451, Autumn.
    3. Bruno Jullien & Patrick Rey, 2007. "Resale price maintenance and collusion," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(4), pages 983-1001, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Aditya Bhattacharjea & Oindrila De & Geeta Gouri, 2019. "Competition Law and Competition Policy in India: How the Competition Commission has Dealt with Anticompetitive Restraints by Government Entities," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(2), pages 221-250, March.
    2. Aditya Bhattacharjea, 2022. "Industrial policy in India since independence," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 565-598, December.
    3. Jeroen Hinloopen & Stephen Martin, 2017. "Introduction to the Special Issue," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 51(2), pages 147-149, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antitrust; Competition policy; India; Territorial restrictions; Vertical restraints;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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