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Of Rebates and Drawbacks: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Company and the Railroads

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  • Michael Reksulak
  • William Shughart

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Suggested Citation

  • Michael Reksulak & William Shughart, 2011. "Of Rebates and Drawbacks: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Company and the Railroads," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 38(3), pages 267-283, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:38:y:2011:i:3:p:267-283
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-011-9279-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dilorenzo, Thomas J., 1985. "The origins of antitrust: An interest-group perspective," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 73-90, June.
    2. Michael Reksulak & William F Shughart & Robert D Tollison & Atin Basuchoudhary, 2004. "Titan Agonistes: The Wealth Effects Of The Standard Oil (N. J.) Case," Research in Law and Economics, in: Antitrust Law and Economics, pages 63-84, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    3. Gilbert Holland Montague, 1902. "The Rise and Supremacy of the Standard Oil Company," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 16(2), pages 265-292.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bolanos, Jose A., 2019. "Energy, uncertainty, and entrepreneurship: John D Rockefeller’s sequential approach to transaction costs management in the early oil industry," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 100852, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Patrick Newman, 2018. "Revenge: John Sherman, Russell Alger and the origins of the Sherman Act," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(3), pages 257-275, March.
    3. William F. Shughart, 2022. "On the Virginia school of antitrust: Competition policy, law & economics and public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 1-19, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Petroleum; Market power; Rebates; Drawbacks; Standard Oil Corporation; D72; H4;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods

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