Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement, 1955—1997: An Empirical Study
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1007865923061
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Cited by:
- Babina, Tania & Barkai, Simcha & Jeffers, Jessica & Karger, Ezra & Volkova, Ekaterina, 2023.
"Antitrust enforcement increases economic activity,"
Working Papers
332, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
- Tania Babina & Simcha Barkai & Jessica Jeffers & Ezra Karger & Ekaterina Volkova, 2023. "Antitrust Enforcement Increases Economic Activity," Working Papers hal-04414184, HAL.
- Tania Babina & Simcha Barkai & Jessica Jeffers & Ezra Karger & Ekaterina Volkova, 2023. "Antitrust Enforcement Increases Economic Activity," Working Papers 23-50, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
- Tania Babina & Simcha Barkai & Jessica Jeffers & Ezra Karger & Ekaterina Volkova, 2023. "Antitrust Enforcement Increases Economic Activity," NBER Working Papers 31597, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2016. "Price Fixing Hits Home: An Empirical Study of US Price-Fixing Conspiracies," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 48(4), pages 361-379, June.
- Tanja Artiga González & Markus Schmid & David Yermack, 2019.
"Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers?,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(10), pages 4813-4840, October.
- Artiga González, Tanja & Schmid, Markus & Yermack, David, 2013. "Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers?," Working Papers on Finance 1309, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance, revised Sep 2017.
- Detre, Joshua D. & Golub, Alla A., 2004. "A Reexamination Of The Profitability Of Price Fixing Using Stock Price Movement: Has New Antitrust Legislation Been A More Effective Deterrent Of Price Fixing?," Staff Papers 28668, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
- Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, 2016.
"Policy Innovations, Political Preferences, and Cartel Prosecutions,"
Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 48(4), pages 405-432, June.
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Keywords
Antitrust enforcement; Sherman Act;Statistics
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