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Knowledge and Power in the Mechanical Firm: Planning for Profit in Austrian Perpsective

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  • Richard Adelstein

Abstract

This essay draws on the transaction costs model of the firm and an Austrian perspective on the knowledge problem in centrally planned orders to propose an empirically useful Austrian theory of central planning. After an initial review of existing theories of the firm, part two develops insights from the calculation debate to sketch a theory of planning centered on the interrelated problems of purpose, information and control in both individual and central planning. Part three joins this theory to the basic framework of the transaction cost model to produce an Austrian theory of the private firm that addresses the relation between knowledge and power in planned orders, and illustrates its principal themes through a discussion of the historical development of American manufacturing in the fifty years prior to World War I. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

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  • Richard Adelstein, 2005. "Knowledge and Power in the Mechanical Firm: Planning for Profit in Austrian Perpsective," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 18(1), pages 55-82, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revaec:v:18:y:2005:i:1:p:55-82
    DOI: 10.1007/s11138-005-5593-3
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    Cited by:

    1. Saras D. Sarasvathy & Nicholas Dew, 2013. "Without judgment: An empirically-based entrepreneurial theory of the firm," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 26(3), pages 277-296, September.
    2. Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein, 2010. "Austrian Economics and the Theory of the Firm," Chapters, in: Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics, chapter 27, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Dingsheng Zhang & Wenli Cheng & Yew-Kwang Ng, 2012. "Increasing Returns, Land Use Controls and Housing Prices," Monash Economics Working Papers 12-14, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    4. Randall G. Holcombe, 2013. "Firms as knowledge repositories," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 26(3), pages 259-275, September.
    5. Richard Adelstein, 2010. "Firms as Social Actors," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2013-003, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.

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