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Free in-network pricing as an entry-deterrence strategy

Author

Listed:
  • Tingting He

    (Saint Anselm College)

  • Dmitri Kuksov

    (University of Texas at Dallas)

  • Chakravarthi Narasimhan

    (Washington University in St. Louis)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the entry-deterring power of free in-network pricing with multiple incumbents. Free in-network pricing may deter entry since it creates network externality that intensifies competition. One may expect that a particular entry-deterrent strategy adopted by all incumbents would have more entry-deterring power than when it is adopted by some incumbents only. However, we show that when free-in network plan has entry-deterrence power with two incumbent firms, sometimes one incumbent offering free in-network plan may have more entry deterrence power than both firms offering free in-network plans. In other words, we find that an asymmetric adoption of entry-deterrence strategies by the incumbent firms may be the best for entry deterrence. This result highlights the importance of the strategic choice of the pricing plan as a function of not only the likelihood/cost of entry but also of the plan choices of other firms, and may partially explain the asymmetric strategies used by competing firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Tingting He & Dmitri Kuksov & Chakravarthi Narasimhan, 2017. "Free in-network pricing as an entry-deterrence strategy," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 279-303, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:qmktec:v:15:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11129-017-9185-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s11129-017-9185-x
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    Cited by:

    1. Jianqiang Zhang & Zhuping Liu & Raghunath Singh Rao, 2018. "Flirting with the enemy: online competitor referral and entry-deterrence," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 209-249, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game theory; Competitive strategy; Entry deterrence; Multi-part tariffs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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