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Partisanship as Information

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  • Warneryd, Karl

Abstract

Intuitively, we associate different political parties with different types of policy. In contrast, this paper shows that, in the absence of differential costs of membership among parties (that is, if party membership is cheap talk), party labels cannot perfectly signal the ideologies of candidates. However, under certain conditions, parties can signal candidate types imperfectly. The paper, therefore, also provides an example of how costless communication can be effective in games of partial conflict. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Warneryd, Karl, 1994. "Partisanship as Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 80(3-4), pages 371-380, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:80:y:1994:i:3-4:p:371-80
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Joseph E. Harrington, 1992. "The Revelation Of Information Through The Electoral Process: An Exploratory Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 255-276, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlof, Johan, 2003. "Hiding information in electoral competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 48-74, January.
    2. Mike Felgenhauer, 2012. "Revealing information in electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 55-68, October.

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