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Toward Applicable Social Choice Theory: A Comparison of Social Choice Functions under Spatial Model Assumptions

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  • Chamberlin, John R.
  • Cohen, Michael D.

Abstract

This article develops a formal framework to aid political designers in the comparison of social choice functions. It generalizes earlier assumptions of “impartial culture” so that we may begin to investigate the effect of politically interesting variations on the probability that different social choice functions will satisfy given performance criteria. As an application of the framework, a detailed Monte Carlo study compares the ability of four different social choice functions to select a Condorcet winner when voter preference orders have been generated from a spatial representation of ideal points and alternatives. We also investigate the potential of alternative methods of selecting winners in presidential primary elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Chamberlin, John R. & Cohen, Michael D., 1978. "Toward Applicable Social Choice Theory: A Comparison of Social Choice Functions under Spatial Model Assumptions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(4), pages 1341-1356, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:72:y:1978:i:04:p:1341-1356_15
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. James Green-Armytage, 2014. "Strategic voting and nomination," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(1), pages 111-138, January.
    2. Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman & Nicholas Miller, 1988. "Centripetal forces in spatial voting: On the size of the Yolk," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 37-50, October.
    3. Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman, 1988. "The Borda count in n-dimensional issue space," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 167-176, November.
    4. Kalogirou, Aikaterini & Panaretos, John, 1999. "Analysis and Comparison of Greek Parliamentary Electoral Systems of the Period 1974-1999," MPRA Paper 6284, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Kiran Tomlinson & Johan Ugander & Jon Kleinberg, 2023. "The Moderating Effect of Instant Runoff Voting," Papers 2303.09734, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
    6. John Chamberlin, 1986. "Discovering manipulated social choices: The coincidence of cycles and manipulated outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 295-313, January.
    7. Florenz Plassmann & T. Tideman, 2014. "How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(1), pages 31-75, January.
    8. James Green-Armytage & T. Tideman & Rafael Cosman, 2016. "Statistical evaluation of voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 183-212, January.
    9. Jeffrey Richelson, 1980. "Running off empty: Run-off point systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 457-468, January.
    10. Nicholas Miller, 2014. "The Alternative Vote and Coombs Rule versus First-Past-the-Post: a social choice analysis of simulated data based on English elections, 1992–2010," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 399-425, March.
    11. William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn, 1981. "Constant scoring rules for choosing one among many alternatives," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 203-210, April.
    12. Postl, Peter, 2017. "Évaluation et comparaison des règles de vote derrière le voile de l’ignorance : Tour d'horizon sélectif et analyse des règles de scores à deux paramètres," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 93(1-2), pages 249-290, Mars-Juin.
    13. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 1-38, January.
    14. Samuel Merrill, 1985. "A statistical model for Condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 389-403, January.
    15. Scott L. Feld & Bernard Grofman, 1992. "Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Cycle? Evidence from 36 Elections," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(2), pages 231-237, April.

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