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Is Minimax Regret Applicable to Voting Decisions?

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  • Mayer, Lawrence S.
  • Good, I. J.

Abstract

In a recent article (“The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis,” APSR, 68 [June, 1974], 525–536) John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina suggest that a (potential) voter may be rational in deciding whether to vote and yet not use the expected-utility calculus introduced for this purpose by Downs and Tullock and extended by Riker and Ordeshook. The authors suggest that a rational voter, in deciding whether to vote, may use the minimax regret criterion due to the late L. J. Savage. Define the regret of an Act A as the difference, if the true state of nature were known (in advance), between the best expected payoff that could be obtained and the expected payoff that would be obtained by act A. Then the minimax regret criterion requires the decision maker to act in such a way as to minimize the maximum regret that he can suffer. They also discuss the fact that the minimax regret criterion does not require the voter to supply any (objective or subjective) estimates of the probabilities associated with the various outcomes of the election. Thus they feel that it is an attractive criterion for decision making under “uncertainty” as opposed to decision making under “risk.”

Suggested Citation

  • Mayer, Lawrence S. & Good, I. J., 1975. "Is Minimax Regret Applicable to Voting Decisions?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 916-917, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:69:y:1975:i:03:p:916-917_24
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:pri:cepsud:196farber is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Ming Li & Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2010. "A Psychologically Based Model of Voter Turnout," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(5), pages 979-1002, October.
    3. Henry S. Farber, 2009. "Rational Choice and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Union Representation Elections," Working Papers 1200, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    4. Henry S. Farber, 2009. "Rational Choice and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Union Representation Elections," Working Papers 1200, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    5. Henry S. Farber, 2009. "Rational Choice and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Union Representation Elections," Working Papers 1185, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    6. Bart Engelen, 2006. "Solving the Paradox," Rationality and Society, , vol. 18(4), pages 419-441, November.
    7. Henry S. Farber, 2010. "Rational Choice and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Union Representation Elections," NBER Working Papers 16160, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Henry S. Farber, 2009. "Rational Choice and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Union Representation Elections," Working Papers 1185, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    9. Bernard Grofman, 1979. "Abstention in two-candidate and three-candidate elections when voters use mixed strategies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 189-200, June.
    10. Farber, Henry S, 2010. "Rational Choice and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Union Representation Elections," IZA Discussion Papers 5033, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. Fred Thompson, 1982. "Closeness counts in horseshoes and dancing ... and elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 305-316, January.
    12. Dennis Mueller, 1986. "Rational egoism versus adaptive egoism as fundamental postulate for a descriptive theory of human behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 3-23, January.
    13. T. Tideman, 1985. "Remorse, elation, and the paradox of voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 103-106, January.

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