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Dynamic games of collective action

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  • Norman Schofield

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Suggested Citation

  • Norman Schofield, 1977. "Dynamic games of collective action," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 77-105, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:30:y:1977:i:1:p:77-105
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718819
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Norman Schofield, 1978. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 45(3), pages 575-594.
    2. Mikdashi, Zuhayr, 1974. "Cooperation Among Oil Exporting Countries with Special Reference to Arab Countries: a Political Economy Analysis," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 28(1), pages 1-30, January.
    3. Schofield, Norman, 1977. "Transitivity of preferences on a smooth manifold of alternatives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 149-171, February.
    4. Norman Schofield, 1975. "A Game Theoretic Analysis of Olson's Game of Collective Action," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 19(3), pages 441-461, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Richards, Diana & Hays, Jude C., 1998. "Navigating a nonlinear environment: An experimental study of decision making in a chaotic setting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 281-308, April.
    2. Norman Schofield, 1980. "Formal political theory," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 249-275, January.

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